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[1] 
Essay 
PUTTING A PRICE ON WHALES TO SAVE THEM:  
WHAT DO MORALS HAVE TO DO WITH IT? 
BY 
HOPE M. BABCOCK* 
The author explores the moral implication of a proposal to create 
an international market in whale shares as an alternative to the 
dysfunctional International Whaling Commission. She finds the 
proposal amoral because whales, like humans, have an intrinsic right to 
life. Since this leaves whales vulnerable to whale hunting nations, she 
suggests that international environmental organizations might help a 
whale preservation norm emerge in whaling nations by using education 
and interventionist activities that focus on whaling’s cruelty to 
ultimately encourage the citizens and governments of those nations to 
change their self-image as whale eating cultures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 *  Hope Babcock is a professor of law at Georgetown University Law School. This Essay 
was first presented as the Twenty-fifth Natural Resources Law Institute Distinguished Visitor 
Lecture given at Lewis & Clark Law School in October 2012, and originated in an Article entitled 
Why Changing Norms Is a More Just Solution to the Failed International Regulatory Regime to 
Protect Whales than a Trading Program in Whale Shares, forthcoming in the Stanford 
Environmental Law Journal (2012). A generous summer writers’ grant from Georgetown Law 
School supported the writing of this Article and Essay. 
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“Environmental law needs ethics because it is blind without values.” 1 
 
This Essay focuses on a commentary published in the journal Nature by 
a professor of natural resource economics at the University of California’s 
Bren School of Environmental Science and Economics, the Dean of the Bren 
School, and an ecologist from Arizona State University.2 The trio—justifiably 
troubled by the inability of the International Whaling Commission (IWC) to 
protect whales because of paralyzing schisms between whaling and non-
whaling members, among other problems—suggested instead that the IWC 
administer an international market in whale shares.3 Under their proposal, 
member nations would receive allowances to hunt whales at “sustainable 
harvest levels.”4 They could harvest their quotas, hold onto them for a year, 
or retire them permanently.5 Some whale shares would be auctioned off with 
the earnings going to conservation efforts (not necessarily whale-related), 
and all allowances would be tradable in a global market.6 
I found the proposal initially seductive, then troubling, eventually 
horrifying; and I stepped back to figure out why—hence the genesis of this 
Essay. I concluded that it was because whales have an intrinsic right to life, 
that the proposal to kill some whales in order to save others was deeply 
bothersome and ultimately unacceptable because of its amorality.7 Since my 
conclusion leaves whales to the mercy of unfixable flaws in the International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling and the dysfunction of the IWC, I 
suggest here that international environmental organizations, through a 
combination of education and interventionist activities focusing on the 
cruelty of whaling, might help a whale preservation norm emerge in whaling 
nations by encouraging the citizens and governments of those nations to 
change their self-image as whale-eating cultures. That this will not be an 
easy task is apparent from an article appearing this summer in The Guardian 
indicating that restaurants in Greenland were serving endangered bowhead 
whale meat to tourists and that its supermarkets were selling endangered fin 
whale meat.8 
 
 1  Jedediah Purdy, Our Place in the World: A New Relationship for Environmental Ethics 
and Law, 62 DUKE L. J. 857, 883 (2013). 
 2  Christopher Costello, Leah R. Gerber & Steven Gaines, Conservation Science: A Market 
Approach to Saving the Whales, 481 NATURE 139 (2012). 
 3  Id. at 139–40. 
 4  Id. at 140. 
 5  Id. 
 6  Id. 
 7  See generally Joseph Daniels Blosser, Ethics Before God and Markets: A Theory of Moral 
Action in Conversation with Adam Smith and Ernst Troeltsch (June 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with author) (discussing the importance of 
interdisciplinary dialogue between theology and economics and exploring how collaboration 
and compromise between liberal theology and mainstream free-market economics might be 
achieved through the concept of moral action). 
 8  Greenland Serving Whale Meat Dishes to Tourists, GUARDIAN, June 26, 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/jun/26/greenland-whale-meat-tourists (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2013). On the other hand, Amazon pulled whale meat products from its Japanese 
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Let me begin with a few words on whales, and the flawed international 
regulatory regime designed to protect them, before I turn to my arguments 
on why we owe whales a moral duty not to kill them, why markets are poor 
exemplars of this principle, and how a whale preservation norm would be 
the better alternative to ensure their survival. 
Whales are magnificent, remarkable animals that have a strong 
magnetic hold on people—the enduring popularity of Moby Dick 9 and Free 
Willy 10 illustrate how whales grab and hold onto our imagination. A further 
example of this fascination is whale-watching, which is a billion dollar global 
industry.11 While hunting is not the only threat to the survival of whales,12 it is 
the most visible one and, for our purposes, the one that drew the attention of 
the journal authors.13 
Because whales reproduce slowly, reach maturity late, travel in small 
pods, and are mostly found on the high seas14 (which are largely 
 
website after it received thousands of messages protesting their sale. Justin McCurry, Amazon 
Removes Whale Meat Products from Japanese Site, GUARDIAN, Feb. 24, 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/feb/24/amazon-whale-meat-japan (last visited Feb. 
17, 2013). 
 9  HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK; OR, THE WHALE (Heritage Press, 1943) (1851). 
 10  FREE WILLY (Warner Bros. 1993). 
 11  See William C.G. Burns, The Berlin Initiative on Strengthening the Conservation Agenda 
of the International Whaling Commission: Toward a New Era for Cetaceans?, 6 J. INT’L. 
WILDLIFE L. & POL’Y 255, 264–65 (2003) (“The whale-watching sector is one of the fastest 
growing tourism industries in the world, experiencing approximately 12% growth annually and 
generating more than $1 billion in revenue. By contrast, the killing of whales now produces only 
approximately $50 million in revenue annually.”). 
 12  See, e.g., Susan C. Alker, Comment, The Marine Mammal Protection Act: Refocusing the 
Approach to Conservation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 527, 568 (1996):  
  In the marine area, one of the largest threats to healthy habitat is not construction or 
development, but pollution. The ocean is polluted with large amounts of plastic, metal, 
glass, lumber, and medical waste products; hydrocarbons such as crude oil and natural 
gas; and offshore dredge spoils, industrial wastes, sewage sludge, explosives, chemical 
munitions, and radioactive waste. Plastic debris enters the ocean primarily from offshore 
oil activities and commercial and recreational boating and fishing, which together 
introduce 6.4 million metric tons of waste to the ocean annually. Plastic waste entangles 
marine mammals, causing wounds, infections, and feeding problems, which can be 
deadly. Offshore dumping of poisonous waste products accounts for 10% of all ocean 
contaminants, and, through feeding, results in high concentrations of toxins in the bodily 
tissues of marine mammals and other species. Poisons can also deplete oxygen levels in 
the water to the point where hundreds of miles of marine ecosystem become imbalanced 
and the marine organisms that require oxygen from the water die. Ecologists argue that 
the ocean no longer has the ability to assimilate all of these wastes. The combined 
effects of pollution, over-fishing, and direct destruction of marine habitats has resulted in 
a 40% decline in marine life over the past few decades, indicating a serious problem with 
the marine ecosystem as a whole. 
 13  It helps that whales are “morally compelling ‘victims’” and that the harm they suffer at 
the hands of humans conform to “traditional ideas of harm” as compared to climate change. See 
Purdy, supra note 1 (manuscript at 51).  
 14  See 15 MAMMALS IV GRZIMEK’S ANIMAL LIFE ENCYCLOPEDIA 6–9 (Hutchins et al. eds., 2d 2004).  
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unregulated),15 they have been especially vulnerable to hunting pressures. 
For hundreds of years, a form of “frontier economics”16 operated in the open 
oceans when it came to whaling. In the early twentieth century, the advent 
of more lethal and efficient methods of killing whales, like exploding 
harpoons and factory ships, accelerated the slaughter.17 Even when it was 
known that whale stocks were rapidly declining, and with them the fate of 
the whaling industry, the pressure to continue hunting whales remained.18 
The unrelenting decline in great whales even came to the attention of the 
League of Nations because of the potential collapse of the whaling industry.19 
By 1948, over 43,000 whales were killed annually.20 
Starting in 1918, there were international attempts to stop the slaughter 
of whales, including one initiative by the whaling industry to protect the 
price of whale oil.21 But all these efforts collapsed because the major whaling 
nations refused to join in.22 Ironically, Norway and Iceland, two of the most 
recondite modern whaling countries, were among the first to pass domestic 
laws limiting whale hunting.23 Finally in 1946, fifteen nations signed the 
 
 15  See, e.g., KRISTINA M. GJERDE ET AL., REGULATORY AND GOVERNANCE GAPS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE CONSERVATION AND SUSTAINABLE USE OF MARINE BIODIVERSITY IN 
AREAS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION 1–6, tbls.1 & 2 (2008), available at 
http://data.iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/EPLP-MS-1.pdf (listing the regulatory and governance gaps 
for the high sea at a global and regional level).  
 16  Gerry J. Nagtzaam, The International Whaling Commission and the Elusive Great White 
Whale of Preservationism, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 391 (2009). 
 17  Adrienne M. Ruffle, Note, Resurrecting the International Whaling Commission: 
Suggestions to Strengthen the Conservation Effort, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 639, 645 (2002):  
The early twentieth century witnessed the development of the modern whaling industry 
and the subsequent devastation of whale stocks throughout the world. During this 
period, scientific and technological advancements such as steam engines and exploding 
harpoon guns led to more efficient kills over a larger geographic area and damaged 
whale populations almost to the brink of extinction.  
See also Ronald J. Haskell, Jr., Abandoning Recent Whale Conservation Initiatives in Japan 
Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 551, 554 (1987) 
(“Historically, economic protectionism prompted whaling nations to agree on harvest quotas. 
Later advances in whaling technology, in conjunction with the attendant increase in profitability 
of whale harvesting, severely diminished whale populations.”). 
 18  See Anthony D’Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales: Their Emerging Right to Life, 85 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 21, 32 (1991) (discussing the history of the whaling industry and the success and 
failure of whaling protocols in the twentieth century). 
 19  Nagtzaam, supra note 16, at 392. 
 20  See id. at 397 (“In the 1946–47 season the number of whales taken jumped to 34,720, and 
by the following season it had increased to 43,378 [Blue Whale Units].”). 
 21  See id. at 394 (“[Whaling companies] created ‘a regime of mutual production restraint,’ 
known as the International Association of Whaling Companies, to stabilize world oil prices by 
limiting production of whale oil.”). 
 22  See id. at 395 (“[T]he main whaling states of this period—Japan, Germany, Chile, 
Argentine, and the U.S.S.R.—refused to be bound by [the IWC] provisions.”). 
 23  See id. at 392 (“In 1902 Norway passed a law strictly limiting its whaling companies’ 
activities with the aim of conserving whale stocks as a valuable state asset. The new law 
stipulated that each whaling station was to have only one catcher and the stations must be fifty 
miles apart. Iceland was the first state to put in place a domestic whaling moratorium on 
whaling—for twenty years, starting from 1915.”). 
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International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling to stop the over-
fishing of whales,24 and in 1949, the IWC was formed;25 the animating goal of 
each was to maintain whale markets.26 The IWC now has eighty-nine 
members, and the Convention remains the principal legal document 
governing the whaling practices of member states.27 
The first three decades of the IWC’s history were extremely 
disappointing from a whale preservation perspective. The commission’s 
restrictions on killing certain whale species had the opposite effect, setting 
off what some describe as the “Whaling Olympics.”28 Members with strong 
whaling industries dominated the proceedings and blocked all efforts to 
establish sustainable whale hunt quotas.29 The result for whales was tragic.30 
Unbridled hunting until the mid-1960s led to the commercial extinction of 
many species like blue, humpback, and fin whales.31 Today, blue whales are 
at 1% of their pre-exploitation levels, humpback whales at less than 5%, and 
fin whales at approximately 15%.32 Some Antarctic baleen species declined 
by over 96% from pre-exploitation levels, and six out of eleven great whale 
species are currently classified as endangered or vulnerable.33 To give an 
idea of the scope of the annual slaughter post-formation of the IWC, 55,795 
whales were killed during the 1950–1951 whaling season. Eight years later, 
 
 24  Id. at 398 & n.175. 
 25  See INT’L COMM’N ON WHALING, FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSION, at 3 (1950), available at 
http://iwcoffice.org/cache/downloads/dh7iwgo54nk8c0sk8ok4ck484/RIWC1.pdf (noting that the 
IWC “was constituted under the provisions of Article III of the International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling signed at Washington on 2nd December, 1946” and that the first meeting 
of the IWC convened May 30, 1949). 
 26  See Ruffle, supra note 17, at 646 (“[T]he IWC was empowered to amend the Convention’s 
Schedule of Regulations . . . by designating protected species, open and closed whaling seasons 
and waters for whaling, determine size limits, methods and intensity of whaling, types of gear to 
be used, methods of measurement and maximum catch returns.”) (citing International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, art. 5, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 1718–19, T.I.A.S. 
1849 [hereinafter ICRW]); see also id. at 658 (“[T]he IWC was given authority over all waters in 
which whaling is carried on by factory ships, land stations or whale catchers.”) (citing ICRW 
art. 1, 62 Stat. at 1717).  
 27  See Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Membership and Contracting Governments, 
http://iwcoffice.org/members (last visited Nov. 6, 2012) (noting that “[m]embership of the IWC is 
open to any country in the world that formally adheres to the 1946 Convention,” listing each 
contracting government, date of adherence, and current commissioner). 
 28  See Nagtzaam, supra note 16, at 401 (“[R]estrictions on taking certain whale species has 
had an effect opposite to that intended. It set in train a technological race to create better ships 
and more advanced killing technologies to achieve designated quotas as rapidly as possible, 
leading to whalers to refer to the period as the ‘Whaling Olympic.’”). 
 29  See Burns, supra note 11, at 257 (“The ICRW’s history over its first three decades was 
highly discouraging, with the parties engaged in commercial whaling operations consistently 
ignoring the recommendations of the IWC’s Scientific Committee and opting for wholly 
unsustainable quotas on most species of great whales.”). 
 30  See Ruffle, supra note 17, at 648 (“From its inception until the late 1960’s . . . ‘[w]hale 
stocks were regularly over-exploited, and scientific advice concerning sustaining catch limits 
was frequently ignored.’”). 
 31  See Burns, supra note 11, at 256. 
 32  Id. at 265–66. 
 33  Id. at 257. 
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with twenty factory ships operating in the Antarctic, 64,586 whales were 
slaughtered and processed on the high seas.34 The IWC functioned more like 
a “whaling cartel,”35 or what Gerry Nagtzaam calls a “whalers’ club.”36 The 
IWC was clearly not protecting whales.37 
In 1972, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
(Stockholm Conference) recommended a ten-year moratorium on whaling to 
allow whale stocks to recover.38 That year, United Nations Secretary General 
Maurice Strong pled the case for whale preservation at the annual meeting 
of the IWC, and the United States introduced a resolution banning the killing 
of whales for ten years, which passed unanimously.39 By 1981, most of the 
world viewed whales as “the heritage of all mankind.”40 
Between 1979 and 1983 membership of the IWC grew to forty-one 
countries, many of whom were openly opposed to or had serious doubts 
about commercial whaling.41 Two United Nations organizations and the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature also began participating 
in IWC proceedings, and international environmental organizations started 
attending proceedings as unofficial observers.42 In 1982, the changed 
composition of the IWC combined with the dire condition of great whales 
enabled the IWC to issue a moratorium on the commercial hunting of sperm 
 
 34  Nagtzaam, supra note 16, at 402 (“In the 1950–51 whaling period, 55,795 whales were taken 
globally, the largest number . . . [of] recorded kills until then. By the 1957–1958 season, the number 
of floating factories operating in Antarctic waters had increased to twenty with two shore stations 
and 257 catchers, and by the following season whalers killed a new high of 64,586 whales.”). 
 35  See Ruffle, supra note 17, at 640–41. 
 36  Nagtzaam, supra note 16, at 402. 
 37  See D’Amato & Chopra, supra note 18, at 47 (“[T]he IWC’s limited membership was long 
dominated by the whaling countries.”). 
 38  Nagtzaam, supra note 16, at 405. 
 39  Id. at 405, 408. 
 40  See Ruffle, supra note 17, at 650; D’Amato & Chopra, supra note 18, at 39 (“[T]he 
Stockholm Conference may be seen as marking a pivotal point between conservationism and 
protectionism, a view reflected in the words of Dr. Robert M. White, who spoke for the United 
States: ‘World whale stocks must be regarded as the heritage of all mankind . . . .’”); see also id. 
(“The representative of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources (IUCN), however, pointed out that ‘the use of a resource belonging to all nations for 
the marginal benefit of relatively few people seemed unjustified.’”). Even before then, the view 
of whales as a resource free for the taking by individuals was beginning to change. See 
Nagtzaam, supra note 16, at 397 (quoting the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson in 1946 as 
saying, “The world’s whale stocks are a truly international resource in that they belong to no 
one single nation, nor to a group of nations, but rather they are wards of the entire world.”). 
 41  See William C.G. Burns, The Berlin Initiative on Strengthening the Conservation Agenda 
of the International Whaling Commission: Toward a New Era for Cetaceans?, 6 J. INT’L WILDLIFE 
L. & POL’Y 255, 258 (2003) (noting that “between 1979 and 1983, membership increased to 41 
member countries, many of which were openly hostile to, or had serious reservations about, 
commercial whaling operations. In 1982, this culminated in the imposition of a moratorium on 
commercial whaling, which continues in effect today.”) (citations omitted). 
 42  See Ruffle, supra note 17, at 647 (“The IWC’s Rules of Procedure allow non-parties and 
intergovernmental organizations to attend the meetings and to be represented by observers.”); 
see also INT’L COMM’N ON WHALING, TWENTY-FOURTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 14–15 (1974), 
available at http://iwcoffice.org/annual-reports (click on “IWC_1974_Twenty-Fourth Report of 
the Commission.pdf”) (providing a list of the delegates and unofficial observers who attended 
the IWC’s 1972 meeting). 
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whales in the northern Pacific Ocean.43 In 1986, the IWC expanded the 
moratorium to cover the commercial catch of all types of whales in all 
whaling areas.44 By 1990, all legal commercial killing of great whales had 
ceased.45 Although initially intended to be a temporary ban while whale 
populations rebounded, the moratorium has remained in effect.46 
However, the refusal of major whaling nations like Norway to join the 
IWC,47 the threat of withdrawal by countries like Japan,48 and the actual 
 
 43  See Haskell, supra note 17, at 562 (“The 1981 IWC Schedule contained a zero quota for 
the Western Division stock of Northern Pacific sperm whales for the 1982 season.”). 
 44  See id. (“In 1982, the IWC enacted a five-year moratorium on all commercial whaling to 
begin in the 1985–86 season and last until 1990.”). 
 45  See Nagtzaam, supra note 16, at 421 (“[F]rom [1990] . . . commercial whaling of the larger 
whale species had become obsolete.”); see also D’Amato & Chopra, supra note 18, at 48 (noting 
that “[v]irtually all commercial whaling activity [had] ceased” despite the fact that the 
moratorium only applied to the ten largest species of great whales). 
 46  See, e.g., Keiko Hirata, Why Japan Supports Whaling, 8 J. INT’L WILDLIFE L. & POL’Y 129, 
145 (2005) (The Japanese regarded “the 1982 moratorium as a temporary measure that was 
supposed to last only until 1990, when the IWC was scheduled to consider scientific research in 
determining whether commercial whaling could be resumed in a sustainable way.”); see also 
Nagtzaam, supra note 16, at 408 (“Such a moratorium on whaling was initially perceived as a 
conservationist measure that would allow stocks to recover over time.”). 
 47  Mark Detsky, Comment, Developments in Conservation and Living Resources: The 
Murky Sea over the Magnificent Whale, COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 2002 Y.B. 35, 38 (2003) 
(“Norway never joined the IWC because of its desire to continue commercial whaling, and 
permits a national take of 674 whales annually.”); see Gail Osherenko, Environmental Justice 
and the International Whaling Commission: Moby-Dick Revisited, 8 J. INT’L. WILDLIFE L. & POL’Y 
221, 227 (2005) (“Norway and Iceland both have used the scientific exemption to allow limited 
hunting of whales by shore-based fleets, and Norway resumed commercial whaling in recent 
years under the objection it filed to the initial moratorium.”). The story of Norway’s continued 
whaling is enmeshed in that country’s presidential politics. See J. Baird Callicott, Whaling in 
Sand County: A Dialectical Hunt for Land Ethical Answers to Questions About the Morality of 
Norwegian Minke Whale Catching, 8 COLO. J. INT’L. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (1997) (“In 1986, the 
[IWC] declared a moratorium on commercial whaling. In the spring of 1993, Norway’s 
Brundtland Administration—hoping to reverse its declining popularity in an election year—
defied the moratorium and unilaterally allowed Norwegian whalers to take 160 minke whales. 
The political ploy was successful; Gro Harlem Brundtland was reelected. Accordingly, during 
the summer of 1993, Norwegians killed 153 minke whales.”); see also id. at 21 (“By obdurately 
asserting a right on behalf of its citizens to kill minke whales, the Brundtland Administration 
may be spending precious moral capital.”). Underlying Brundtland’s decision was national 
pride. See id. at 2 (“Somehow, Norwegian national pride seems bound up with the right to kill 
whales.”); see also id. at 17 (“Norwegians justify whaling, especially minke whaling, by . . . an 
argument from tradition and culture. Perhaps it is a matter of appropriate attitude and 
intention.”). Biology may have also contributed to Norway’s pro-whaling stance:  
      Why, in any case, did the Norwegian government allow only the resumption of 
minke whaling? For two reasons, one bio-economic, the other bio-cultural. . . . 
[M]odern commercial whalers did not concentrate their efforts on minkes until the 
mid-1970s—after the preferred species populations had become so depleted and 
capture technologies so improved that minke whales were worth pursuing. 
Fortunately, the minke whale came through this decade of global persecution 
numerically diminished, but not endangered. Therefore, some believe that further 
killing can and should be sustained. 
Id. at 2–3. 
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withdrawal by Canada and Iceland49 have prevented the IWC from taking 
more aggressive efforts to protect whales or enforce the moratorium’s 
terms. The Convention allows lethal scientific research on whales and 
aboriginal hunting,50 exceptions that countries like Japan and Norway have 
relentlessly exploited.51 Countries may also “opt out” of any regulation they 
do not like.52 Japan is the largest user of the scientific research exemption, 
killing thousands of whales since the ban against whaling came into effect in 
198653 and making regular use of the opt-out provision.54 
 
 48  Jay Alabaster, Commercial Whaling: Japan May Quit International Whaling Commission 
if Ban Stays, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 15, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/From-the-news-
wires/2010/0615/Commercial-whaling-Japan-may-quit-International-Whaling-Commission-if-ban-
stays (last visited Oct. 29, 2012). 
 49  See Alison Rieser, Whales, Whaling, and the Warming Oceans, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
401, 417 n.80 (2009) (“The Government of Iceland withdrew from the IWC in 1992 after the IWC 
voted not to lift the moratorium after its first ten years. It then entered into an agreement 
creating the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission with Norway, the Faroe Islands, and 
Greenland. Iceland ‘rejoined’ in 2002 after a special meeting and vote allowing Iceland to ‘re-
adhere’ to the ICRW with a reservation on the moratorium after 2006.”)(internal citation 
omitted); Brian Trevor Hodges, The Cracking Façade of the International Whaling Commission 
as an Institution of International Law: Norwegian Small-Type Whaling and the Aboriginal 
Subsistence Exemption, 15 J. ENVTL L. & LITIG. 295, 297 (2000) (“Since the passage of the 
moratorium, both Canada and Iceland have left the IWC.”). 
 50  Ruffle, supra note 17, at 651 (“[T]he moratorium went into effect with two compromise 
clauses—aboriginal subsistence whaling and scientific whaling.”); see also Nagtzaam, supra 
note 16, at 438 (noting that the United States’ use of the aboriginal exemption has allowed states 
such as Japan, Iceland, and Norway to argue for increased whaling through the device of 
aboriginal whaling); see also Burns, supra note 11, at 271 (“While . . . [the scientific research 
exemption] was used extremely sparingly prior to the imposition of the moratorium on 
commercial whaling, Iceland, Norway, and Japan have conducted extensive whaling operations 
under the rubric of scientific research in the ensuing 15 years, taking more than 7500 whales 
between them.”). 
 51  See Nagtzaam, supra note 16, at 417 (“The moratorium was confined to commercial 
whaling and it allowed exemptions if registered with the IWC, which countries like Japan and 
Norway were quick to exploit.”). 
 52  See id. at 399–400 (“The ICRW also allows dissenting states to opt out of any decision 
arrived at within the IWC by filing an objection within ninety days and applying for an 
exemption under Article V(3), a loophole that would allow rogue whaling states significant 
wiggle room in evading IWC directives.”). See also Ruffle, supra note 17, at 642 (“[The] ‘opt out’ 
provision in the treaty makes it virtually impossible for the Commission to curtail the actions of 
member nations who oppose a specific regulation.”); id. at 652 (“[A]ny country that disagrees 
with a particular IWC regulation may, by filing an objection, delay its implementation and 
exempt itself from the regulation pursuant to the opt-out clause of the ICRW.”). 
 53  See Alexander Gillespie, Whaling Under a Scientific Auspice: The Ethics of Scientific 
Research Whaling Operations, 3 J. INT’L WILDLIFE L. & POL’Y 1, 34 (2000) (“Since 1986, when the 
moratorium on commercial whaling came into force, Japanese whalers have killed over 3,500 
whales under the auspices of the ICRW’s scientific research provision. As of 1997, 1222 whales 
had been taken from the New Zealand sector (Area V) and a further 1546 from the Australian 
sector (Area IV) in the Antarctic.”); see also id. at 40 (“Despite these resolutions, since 1995, the 
Japanese government has expanded its annual take of whales from this sector from 300 to 400 
(+/–10%) per year.”). See also Burns, supra note 11, at 271–72 (“Since 1987, Japan has invoked 
Article VIII to kill approximately 6000 minke, Bryde’s, sperm whales, and sei whales in the 
Southern Ocean (including minke whales in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary) and North 
Pacific.”); Hirata, supra note 46, at 135 (“In 2002, JARPN II was expanded further to include 
additional catches and species (i.e., 50 each of minke whales from coastal waters and sei 
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The IWC has few enforcement powers over member nations because 
the Convention allows it only to make “recommendations” to the offending 
state.55 It has no enforcement power over non-member nations, and 
members can only enforce IWC regulations within their territorial 
jurisdiction56—Australia is an example of a country that has used its power 
to protect whales in its territorial waters.57 The decision in Japanese Whaling 
Association v. American Cetacean Society58 blocked the United States from 
using the threat of economic pressure to compel compliance with IWC 
regulations.59 
 
whales from offshore). As a result, Japan’s scientific whaling programs captured and killed 600 
whales that year—440 Antarctic minke whales through JAPRA, plus 100 North Pacific minke 
whales, 50 Bryde’s whales, 10 sperm whales, 50 sei whales, and 50 minke whales along the 
Pacific seaboard (through JARPN II). This was double the catch in the initial scientific whaling 
program (300 Antarctic minke whales in 1988) and the largest kill since the program began.”). 
Norway, Iceland, and Korea have renewed their scientific research permits perhaps because of 
Japan’s success at using the exemption to get around the ban. See Gillespie, supra, at 53 
(“Norway has invoked research needs to kill 288 minke whales in the Northeast Atlantic; 
Iceland 292 fin whales and 70 sei whales in the North Atlantic; and Korea 69 minke whales in 
the Sea of Japan.”); Burns, supra note 11, at 272 (“Iceland, which very recently re-adhered to the 
ICRW, proposed a scientific research program that would authorize the killing of 100 minke, 100 
fin, and 50 sei whales each year for two years.”).  
 54  See Ruffle, supra note 17, at 651 (“Japan’s objection effectively rendered the IWC 
powerless to enforce the moratorium against the country pursuant to the opt-out provision of 
the ICRW.”); see also Nagtzaam, supra note 16, at 442 (“Japan . . . lodged an objection [to the 
creation of the Southern Ocean whale sanctuary] and thus can still legally hunt minke whales in 
the region as well as continue to and try to eliminate the sanctuary exception.”). 
 55  See Ruffle, supra note 17, at 659 (“The only leverage the Commission retains is the power 
to ‘make recommendations to any or all contracting Governments on any matter that relates to 
whales or whaling and to the objectives and purposes of this Convention.’” (quoting ICRW, art. 
VI, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849)); see also id. at 642 (“[T]he ICRW’s only 
enforcement mechanism for addressing violations of IWC regulations is squarely based on the 
concept of self-policing.”). 
 56  See id. at 653 (“[A]ll authority to punish infractions is vested within the country having 
jurisdiction over the violations.”). 
 57  See Nagtzaam, supra note 16, at 414 (“At the 1979 IWC meeting Australia announced that 
its position would be to prohibit whaling in its own waters and oppose the taking of whales in 
international waters.”). 
 58  478 U.S. 221 (1986). 
 59  See David S. Lessoff, Note, Jonah Swallows the Whale: An Examination of American and 
International Failures To Adequately Protect Whales from Impending Extinction, 11 J. ENVTL. L. 
& LITIG. 413, 419 (1996) (“[I]n Japanese Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society . . . 
the Court found that a taking of whales in violation of the quotas set forth by the IWC was not, 
in effect, a clear ‘diminishing of the effectiveness’ of the IWC.” (quoting Japanese Whaling 
Association, 478 U.S. at 237)); see also id. (“This decision effectively removed any hope in using 
economic threats to assist in gaining the compliance of Japan and other whaling nations with 
the IWC quotas.”). See generally U.S. Dep’t of State, Clinton Letter to Congress on Japan’s 
Whaling Practices (Dec. 29. 2000), 3 J. INT’L. WILDLIFE L. & POL’Y 311 (2001) (discussing the 
United States’ history of using the Pelly Amendments to curtail Japan’s use of the scientific 
research exemption and whaling in protected areas). Reflecting its disgust with Japan’s outlaw 
posture with respect to the IWC and its resolutions, the Clinton Administration went so far as to 
recommend that the next meeting of the IWC not be held in Tokyo:  
I have personally intervened with Prime Minister Mori. We also joined 14 other 
governments in making a high-level demarche to the Japanese Government to protest its 
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Moreover, the IWC has no authority to monitor whaling activities or 
impose penalties on members who violate its regulations.60 Many violations 
of IWC regulations are undetected or under-reported.61 This contributes to 
the indeterminacy of whale stock estimates that undergird hunting quotas on 
unprotected whales,62 making these quotas vulnerable to challenge by 
whaling members. Even a highly controversial requirement that whaling 
ships carry at least two inspectors on board has not improved the accuracy 
of reporting because inspectors are appointed and funded by their own 
governments and have a tendency to overlook infractions.63 IWC has been 
unsuccessful in its attempts to encourage DNA testing of whale products, 
discourage the stockpiling of whale meat, and establish a register of whaling 
ships to eliminate the practice of vessels flying “flags of convenience.”64 
Finally, an inherent tension between the Convention’s animating goal of 
ensuring the whaling industry’s “orderly development” as reflected in its 
Preamble,65 and the more modern goal of protecting whales for their own 
sake,66 has generated acrimonious debate among the member nations and 
prevented the IWC from achieving either goal.67 Today, the IWC is rigidly 
divided into members who favor permanently preserving whales, and those 
who want to conserve them only long enough to enable whale stocks to 
 
decision to issue the permits. In September, we canceled a bilateral fisheries meeting 
that we have been holding annually for more than a decade. We also declined to 
participate in a ministerial meeting on environmental issues in August hosted by Japan. 
We have also actively supported the selection of a country other than Japan to host the 
next intersessional meeting of the IWC. As a result, the IWC voted 17-10 to hold the 
meeting in Monaco instead of Tokyo. 
Id. at 313–14; see also Hirata, supra note 46, at 134 (“Although the Clinton administration did 
not in the end impose trade sanctions, it expressed its disapproval of Japan’s new program by 
boycotting a UN environmental conference in Japan.”). 
 60  Lessoff, supra note 59, at 423–24 (“The IWC’s inability to impose penalties against 
nations has not curtailed harvesting of whales in excess of IWC quotas and, as a result, whale 
stocks continue to plummet throughout the world.”); Ruffle, supra note 17, at 642 (“[T]he IWC 
has no ability to monitor whaling activities in waters under its auspices.”). 
 61  Ruffle, supra note 17, at 658 (“[M]any violations [of the Convention] are unnoticed or 
under-reported and essentially unpunished on an international level.”). 
 62  See id.  
 63  Id. at 668 (“[These measures have] proven ineffective since a strong tendency exists for 
inspectors appointed and financed by their own governments to overlook infractions.”). 
 64  See, e.g., Burns, supra note 11, at 261 (“While the parties adopted the [Revised 
Management Procedure] in 1994, adoption of the [Revised Management Scheme] has been 
thwarted by continued conflicts between the parties over elements of the inspection and 
observation scheme, including funding and the level of coverage.”); see also Patricia Birnie, 
Legal Measures for Prevention of “Pirate” Whaling, in LEGAL MEASURES FOR THE CONSERVATION 
OF MARINE MAMMALS 2, 5 (1982) (discussing the widespread use of the “flag of convenience” 
system and how it allows whaling vessels to register with non-party states for purposes of 
evading IWC regulations). 
 65  See Nagtzaam, supra note 16, at 398 (“The Preamble outlined the Convention as being 
about the orderly development of a commercial whaling industry and the conservation of 
existing whale stocks.”).  
 66  See id. at 387–88 (discussing “preservationism,” which “accords an intrinsic or non-
instrumental value to the world”).  
 67  See Osherenko, supra note 47, at 233; Rieser, supra note 49, at 402. 
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return to sustainable levels so that they can be hunted again.68 Strong 
differences of opinion on the underlying moral rectitude of each side’s 
position and conflicting societal values make it particularly hard to resolve 
the conflict.69 Doremus’s comment that “value conflicts complicate 
environmental policy decisions by polarizing the debate,”70 is exactly what 
has happened on the IWC with respect to the future of whales. These value 
conflicts: 
[M]ake it easy for the contesting sides to demonize each other, and hard for 
them to find common ground. They tend to encourage both sides to look for 
alternative “objective” grounds for decisions. Yet they make that search more 
difficult, by encouraging people to cling tenaciously to any evidence that 
supports their view, by making it difficult for people to communicate with one 
another, and by frustrating the search for a common measure of value.71 
The continued division of the IWC into pro- and anti-whaling camps has 
led to its paralysis and may lead to its dissolution.72 Unfortunately, as 
Doremus notes, environmental conflicts like the one involving whales “are 
often zero-sum, meaning that no win-win solution is possible.”73 
The Nature authors are right to the extent that the international 
regulatory system for protecting whales is clearly broken—perhaps beyond 
repair. So why not create a market in tradeable whale shares, which could 
lead to fewer whale kills, and might gain the support of both whaling and 
 
 68  A recent example of this is the IWC’s rejection of a proposal by several South American 
countries to create a whale sanctuary south of the equator between South America and Africa. 
The sanctuary would have covered breeding grounds for all the great whales swimming in the 
South Atlantic, which generated opposition from Japan, China, Norway, Russia, and Iceland, 
among other member states. See Emily Alpert, Japan, Norway and Allies Vote Down South 
Atlantic Whale Sanctuary, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 2012, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_ 
now/2012/07/japan-norwayatlantic-whale-sanctuary.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2012).  
 69  See Holly Doremus, Constitutive Law and Environmental Policy, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 295, 
297 (2003) (“[T]he bitterness with which environmental disputes have been contested for the 
past generation demonstrates how strongly they invoke core, and conflicting, values.”).  
 70  Id. at 321. 
 71  Id.; see also Osherenko, supra note 47, at 233 (“The IWC is caught today in a clash of 
values between those who wish to protect whale species and ensure healthy stocks of whales 
and those who argue against commercial harvests of whales not only on environmental and 
ecological grounds but on the cultural grounds that nonhuman animals (and particularly marine 
mammals, including whales) have certain rights. Navigating between the polar shores of this 
debate, the IWC is caught in the ice of the moratorium.”). 
 72  See Dan Goodman, The “Future of the IWC”: Why the Initiative to Save the International 
Whaling Commission Failed, 14 J. INT’L. WILDLIFE L. & POL’Y 63, 71–72 (2011) (describing the role 
of anti-whaling NGOs in blocking an initiative to bring the two sides to the table to negotiate a 
framework for resolving the conflict); see also Rieser, supra note 49, at 402 (“[D]eliberations of 
the [IWC] . . . have deteriorated into an annual confrontation between the proponents of 
conflicting values: biodiversity preservation versus consumptive use of marine wildlife. The 
whaling regime has been verging on dissolution over the issue of commercial whaling for 
almost two decades.”). 
 73  Doremus, supra note 69, at 321. Here too, expanding the pie through conserving whales 
until sustainable populations are achieved would not eliminate the conflict over whether whales 
should be hunted at all. See id. at 322 (“We cannot avoid conflicts by expanding the pie.”). 
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whale preservation members to end the deadlock on the IWC?74 For one 
reason, “an unfettered market is unable to determine appropriate value and 
will result in under-value and over-use of the environment.”75 For another 
reason, market-based trading programs, like the one proposed by the three 
academics, do not create an incentive to go beyond a set point. For example, 
in the case of carbon dioxide reductions, implementing a cap on emissions 
lowers incentives to reduce pollution below that level—what Nicholas and 
Juergensmeyer call the “equilibrium point.”76 Indeed, the academics’ 
proposal would allow whales to be killed up to the equilibrium point of 
whale stock sustainability77—a point that cetacean scientists say is based on 
inadequate science78 and one that the flawed international regulatory system 
would be incapable of reducing should it not be low enough to protect 
whales.79 While there are additional problems with relying on markets as a 
substitute for regulation, such as distinguishing between legal and illegal 
activities, non-transparency, and valuation challenges,80 this Essay focuses 
only on the moral bankruptcy of the proposal based on what I believe is a 
whale’s entitlement to life. This Essay also argues that markets have moral 
limits, as Michael Sandel suggests in his 1998 Oxford Tanner Lectures,81 and 
that there are some things money simply cannot buy, one of which is the life 
 
 74  Costello, Gerber & Gaines, supra note 2, at 140. 
 75  Stephanie E. Curran, The Preservation of the Intrinsic: Ecosystem Valuation in New 
Zealand, 9 N.Z. J. ENVTL. L. 51, 60 (2005). Purdy also argues that the focus on economics in 
environmental law has emphasized the value of welfarism, which emphasizes the “sum . . . of 
the whole,” and in turn can lead to “disregarding or sacrificing inconveniently situated 
individuals or sloughing over values that some people treasure.” Purdy, supra note 1, at 882. 
Purdy goes on to state that “no maximizing strategy—even one also concerned with 
distribution—genuinely approximates the individualistic Pareto criterion, with its requirement 
that changes make no one worse off. Maximizing strategies generate distributive decisions, 
which, for practical purposes, always disadvantage some individuals relative to plausible 
alternatives.” Id. 
 76  See James C. Nicholas & Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Market Based Approaches to 
Environmental Preservation: To Environmental Mitigation Fees and Beyond, 43 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 837, 851 (2003) (“[M]any tradeable emissions programs fail to provide an incentive 
for continuous pollution reduction.”). Nicholas and Juergensmeyer call this “the equilibrium 
point.” See id. at 851–52 (defining the “equilibrium point” as the state at which “no incentive 
remains to further reduce pollution”). 
 77  See id. at 848–49 (“Polluters are then allowed to continue to pollute up to the level authorized 
by their credits or sell the credits they possess to other polluters in the same program.”). 
 78  Lessoff, supra note 59, at 422 (“What data exists [sic] are questionable in many aspects, 
fragmentary, and at best, highly speculative. Information on the marine ecosystem necessary for 
any real understanding of living whales is almost totally lacking.”) (quoting Dr. L. Talbot, a 
former U.S. delegate to the IWC and member of the IWC Scientific Committee)).  
 79  See id. at 428–29.  
 80  See, e.g., Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Harms, Use Conflicts, and Neutral Baselines in 
Environmental Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 1505, 1543–44 (2011) (“Many environmental consequences are 
difficult to monetize because they are not traded in markets and thus are often excluded from 
cost-benefit analyses.”). 
 81  See generally Michael J. Sandel, Professor of Gov’t, Harvard Univ., What Money Can’t 
Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets, Delivered at Brasenose College, Oxford (May 11 & 12, 1998), 
in TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES, 1997–1998, at 89, available at http://tannerlectures. 
utah.edu/lectures/documents/sandel00.pdf (discussing how the moral importance of goods can 
be degraded by market valuation and exchange). 
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of a being with moral worth. If an argument can be made that whales have a 
right to life, then it is morally wrong to deprive them of it, and we should not 
condone the academics’ proposal. 
This Essay uses criteria that animal rights scholars such as Cass 
Sunstein, Gary Francione, Tom Regan, and David Hoch employ to build a 
case that animals like whales have a right to life based on their moral worth, 
and that humans have a moral duty to respect that right.82 For example, 
animal rights scholars like Francione consider animals to be “autonomous 
subjects” with a capacity to have preferences and to act on those 
preferences.83 Francione calls this a “core consciousness”—a “continuous 
mental existence” that translates into an interest in survival and not being 
killed.84 To Francione a right to life is based on an animal’s consciousness 
and nothing more.85 Hoch says an animal’s interest in survival creates in 
humans a moral duty toward them,86 and anything that impedes the 
realization of this duty, like killing them, is against the animal’s interests and 
goals, and is therefore morally suspect.87 He also says that animals have 
 
 82  See, e.g., Ian Sample, Whales and Dolphins ‘Should have Legal Rights’, GUARDIAN, Feb. 20, 
2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/21/whales-dolphins-legal-rights (last visited Nov. 
8, 2012) (describing an initiative by the American Association for the Advancement of Science and 
various ethicists to have dolphins and whales be considered “nonhuman persons” to enable their 
protection under international law based on the intelligence, self-awareness, and complex 
behavior of marine mammals). But see Whales Not Slaves Because They Are Not People, Judge in 
SeaWorld Case Rules, GUARDIAN, Feb. 9, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
environment/2012/feb/09/whales-not-slaves-judge-seaworld (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (describing 
the dismissal of a lawsuit brought by People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals against 
Seaworld on the ground that “[t]he only reasonable interpretation of the 13th Amendment’s plain 
language is that it applies to persons and not to non-persons such as orcas”).  
 83  See Ellen P. Goodman, Book Review: Animal Ethics and the Law, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1291, 
1300 (2006) (reviewing ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS (Cass R. 
Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004)) (“The basic tenet of animal rights is that animals 
who can be considered autonomous subjects have rights, and humans have associated duties.”). 
 84  See id. at 1301–02 (referring to Francione, and noting that “[a]ny animal that has a sense 
of self, he says, has an interest in continued existence in addition to an interest in happiness”); 
see also id. at 1302 (“Animals who possess this core consciousness, even if they lack an 
autobiographical sense of their lives, have ‘a continuous mental existence,’ which Francione 
contends gives them ‘an interest in their lives’ and in not being killed.” (quoting Gary L. 
Francione, Animals—Property or Persons?, in ANIMALS RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW 
DIRECTIONS 108, 128 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004))); id. at 1307 (noting 
that “animals have dignitary interests”) . 
 85  See, e.g., id. at 1301 (“Francione makes a right to life dependent on animal 
consciousness, not mere sentience.”). 
 86  See David Hoch, Environmental Ethics and Nonhuman Interests: A Challenge to 
Anthropocentric License, 23 GONZ. L. REV. 331, 346 (1987–88) (“If animals have interests, we 
have moral obligations toward them.”). 
 87  See Patrick Lee & Robert P. George, The Nature and Basis of Human Dignity, 21 RATIO 
JURIS 173, 179 (2008) (“One can then say that what promotes the organism’s survival and 
flourishing is in its interest and what diminishes its chances of survival or flourishing is against 
its interests.”); see also Gillespie, supra note 53, at 14 (“[T]his construct suggests that individual 
animals, as is the case with humans, that possess inherent value may not be sacrificed for 
utilitarian goals.”). 
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inherent rights that humans are bound to respect.88 Regan suggests that an 
animal’s goals give it an inherent value beyond any instrumental value it 
might have, and “since inherent value cannot be ranked,” animals are 
“entitled to equal, inviolable, moral treatment vis-à-vis other possessors of 
inherent value.”89 
While possessing freedom of choice or autonomy from human control 
does not necessarily mean that animals “have full basic and inherent dignity 
(moral worth) or rights,”90 humans recognize moral worth in animals and feel 
a sense of moral responsibility towards them because of their “intrinsic 
value.”91 This sentiment may be based on a sense of affection and empathy 
people feel for animals like whales92 because of analogous neurological 
features and feelings,93 as well as social and psychological needs.94 Barbara 
 
 88  See Hoch, supra note 86, at 336 (“Regan claims that animals have certain inherent rights 
that moral agents are ethically bound to recognize and honor.”). 
 89  See Gillespie, supra note 53, at 14; see also id. at 13 (“Regan argues that beings that are 
the subject of life, and have goals important to them, should be deemed to possess inherent 
value. In turn, inherent value should make them valuable in their own right, irrespective of any 
instrumental value they may possess in the eyes of humans.”). 
 90  See Lee & George, supra note 87, at 179 (“[F]lourishing includes pleasure and lack of 
pain (though it also includes other things such as their life and their activities). Yet it does not 
follow from these points that they have full basic and inherent dignity (moral worth) or 
rights.”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Rights of Animals, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 399 (2003) 
(The “goal [of animal rights advocates] can be taken far more ambitiously, as an effort to say 
that animals should have rights of self-determination, or a certain kind of autonomy. Hence 
some people urge that certain animals, at least, are ‘persons,’ not property, and that they should 
have many of the legal rights that human beings have.”). 
 91  See Goodman, supra note 83, at 1293 (“[An approach to animal protection] influenced by 
Kantian philosophical traditions . . . takes as its starting point the claim that animals have moral 
claims to life and liberty. If such rights exist, then, it follows, it is wrong to treat animals as a 
means to human ends.”); see also Sunstein, supra note 90, at 396 (“[A]nimals have intrinsic as 
well as instrumental value.”). 
 92  See Lessoff, supra note 59, at 413–14 (“The behavioral similarities between whales and 
man have long been established by the scientific community, and these similarities have raised 
considerable concern about man’s reluctance to allow these creatures to live beside us 
unharmed. The Federation of American Scientists has noted that there is a good deal to be said 
for empathizing with whales, as the area of the whale[‘]s brain associated with the control of 
emotion is equally well developed to that of man. Additionally, whales, like man, communicate 
with others of their same kind in a language which has been described as an ‘abstruse 
mathematical poetry.’ And unlike man, whose ability to communicate with other species is 
rudimentary at best, whales have developed interspecies communication with other sea 
creatures such as dolphins. Like man, whales care for their young and the young reciprocate 
affection after being reared and finding independence from their mothers. Whales are social 
animals who live in large groups, and some species live monogamous lives, taking only one 
mate. Documented evidence exists of incidents in which a whale is harpooned and taken ashore 
and its mate has lingered, waiting offshore for days, and sometimes weeks before departing out 
to sea.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 93  Barbara Newell, Animal Custody Disputes: A Growing Crack in the “Legal Thinghood” of 
Nonhuman Animals, 6 ANIMAL L. 179, 183–84 (2000):  
According to neurologist Dr. David O. Wiebers: “The EEGs of animals are analogous to 
those of humans . . . . This is not surprising given that the brain structure and other 
central and peripheral nervous system structures and circuitry, down to the cellular 
level, are analogous in humans and other animals . . . . These structures include . . . 
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Newell says this affection has moved public opinion from viewing animals as 
“mere property” to “recognizing that they are sentient and emotive beings,” 
deserving protection.95 
The moral duty humans feel toward animals may also flow from their 
capabilities—in the case of whales, from the size of their brains and the 
superior intelligence they display in their ability to communicate and hunt 
cooperatively.96 To J. Baird Callicott, since whales are members of the same 
biotic community of intelligent, “warm blooded, live-birthing, long-lived, 
suckling, nurturing, playful, curious, learning beings”97 as humans are, they 
should be owed comparable moral respect. If Sunstein is right that what 
animals deserve in terms of human treatment should be related to their 
capacities,98 then killing whales that have capacities comparable to humans 
is equivalent to “murder,”99 and therefore amoral, according to Taimie 
Bryant. An animal’s rational nature may also be the basis for granting them 
“full moral worth,” even if they cannot conceptualize, sense anything other 
than their existence, project into the future in their deliberations, or choose 
between options like humans.100 
 
sensory systems for pain and touch perception, vision, hearing, taste, and smell; and, in 
many cases, centers which mediate mood and personality.” Other physicians and 
scientists have made similar observations about the minds of humans and other animals. 
The eminent British neurologist Lord Walter Russell Brain (1895–1966) observed . . . “I at 
least cannot doubt that the interests and activities of animals are correlated with 
awareness and feeling in the same way as my own”  
Id. (quoting David O. Wiebers, Healing Society’s Relationship with Animals: A Physician’s View, 
44 SUNRISE 164, 164–65, 167 (1995), available at http://www.theosociety.org/pasadena/ 
sunrise/44-94-5/an-wieb2.htm). 
 94  See id. at 184 (“Biologists and ethologists likewise have established that mammals have their 
own needs and desires, including those of a social and psychological nature, as well as physical.”). 
 95  Newell, supra note 93, at 182 (“As Judge Andell stated: ‘[t]he law must be informed by 
evolving knowledge and attitudes. Otherwise, it risks becoming irrelevant as a means of 
resolving conflicts. Society has long since moved beyond the untenable Cartesian view that 
animals are unfeeling automatons and, hence, mere property. The law should reflect society’s 
recognition that animals are sentient and emotive beings that are capable of providing 
companionship to the humans with whom they live.”) (quoting Bueckner v. Hamel, 886 S.W.2d 
368, 377–78 (Tex. App. 1st 1994)). 
 96  Ruffle, supra note 17, at 667 (“Proponents of whale preservation tend to base their 
arguments on scientific knowledge of whales indicating that the animals are intelligent, sentient 
beings capable of communication. For example, studies suggest that the large brain size of 
whales coupled with systematic and cooperative hunting techniques exhibit the superior mental 
abilities of marine mammals. Further evidence of whales’ intelligence is found in their ability to 
communicate with one another. Much remains unknown about the species. This deficiency in 
knowledge can be remedied through use of non-lethal scientific research.”). 
 97  Callicott, supra note 47, at 23. 
 98  Sunstein, supra note 90, at 401 (“[T]he rights that animals deserve should be related to 
their capacities.”).  
 99  See Taimie L. Bryant, Sacrificing the Sacrifice of Animals: Legal Personhood for Animals, 
the Status of Animals as Property, and the Presumed Primacy of Humans, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 247, 
256 (2008). 
 100  Lee & George, supra note 87, at 187 (“Neither sentience nor life itself entails that those 
who possess them must be respected as ends in themselves or as creatures having full moral 
worth. Rather, having a rational nature is the ground of full moral worth.”). But it should be 
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According to Francione, the capacity of animals to feel creates another 
source of moral duty towards them; thus creating a basic “liberty right[]”for 
animals.101 Bentham argued that the shared capacity with humans to feel pain 
creates a moral duty towards them;102 to modern animal welfare scholars, 
this shared capacity to feel pain raises the ethical bar and gives animals 
“moral worth” comparable to humans.103 Thus, from a theoretical 
perspective, while animals like whales are certainly not human, that does 
not mean they are devoid of moral worth and have no entitlement to life. 
Then there are pragmatic reasons to grant whales a right to life. They 
occupy a critical place in an ecosystem upon which humans depend. 
According to Mark Coeckelbergh, this dependency makes it unjust to 
exclude these animals from our “moral sphere and related conceptual 
frameworks.”104 Viewing whales as “co-operands” diminishes the importance 
of ontological similarities or dissimilarities between whales and humans105—
we only need to see that they are “an integral and necessary part of a wider 
co-operative (quasi-)social scheme.”106 Therefore, to Coeckelbergh, 
excluding animals like whales from a moral scheme is an unjustifiable 
conceit and an indefensible “value-laden belief.”107 Under modern ethical 
principles, this respect should at a minimum imply non-interference with 
other members of our biotic community.108 While hunting may be an 
exception to these principles, it should not cause unnecessary suffering. 
Causing an animal to suffer—what Sunstein calls “unconscionable 
barbarity”109—debases humanity, while treating animals well improves 
 
noted that Lee and George believe that only humans possess this trait. See id. at 191 (“[H]uman 
beings are animals of a special kind. They differ in kind from other animals because they have a 
rational nature, a nature characterized by having the basic natural capacities for conceptual 
thought and deliberation and free choice.”). 
 101  Goodman, supra note 83, at 1301 (“Francione, perhaps most radical of the animal rights 
theorists . . . argu[es] that animals qualify for basic liberty rights merely because they feel.”). 
 102  Hoch, supra note 86, at 334–35 (“Bentham argued that if animals are capable of suffering 
then humans have more duties toward them.”).  
 103  See Lee & George, supra note 87, at 176 (“Animal welfarists argue that the criterion of 
moral worth is simply the ability to experience enjoyment and suffering.”). 
 104  Mark Coeckelbergh, Distributive Justice and Co-Operation in a World of Humans and 
Non-Humans: A Contractarian Argument for Drawing Non-Humans into the Sphere of Justice, 
15 RES PUBLICA 67, 70–71 (2009).  
 105  Id. at 70 (“[T]here is no need to assume or demand that the co-operands be moral or 
ontological equals.”).  
 106  See id. at 74–75 (“If we take seriously the fact that the human world depends on the non-
human world, then it is not even necessary to blur the categorical line between the moral status 
of humans and that of non-humans to understand non-humans as an integral and necessary part 
of a wider co-operative (quasi-)social scheme.”).  
 107  Coeckelbergh, supra note 104, at 72. 
 108  On the topic of environmental ethics and environmental law, see generally Purdy, supra 
note 1, at 859–60 (arguing for the continuing relevance and importance of environmental ethics 
in developing a theory of nature and the place of humans in it). 
 109  See Sunstein, supra note 90, at 401 (“I believe that in the long run, our willingness to subject 
animals to unjustified suffering will be seen as a form of unconscionable barbarity—not the same 
as, but in some ways morally akin to, slavery and the mass extermination of human beings.”). 
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human welfare.110 Whale hunting is anything but humane111 and therefore 
should not be countenanced as an exception to these ethical precepts. 
Additionally, whales occupy a place in the pyramid of life that Aldo 
Leopold’s Land Ethic famously celebrates.112 When so little is understood 
about whales, a keystone species in the marine ecosystem, the land ethic 
dictates that it is wiser not to kill them.113 Recognizing the 
interconnectedness of life forms also increases the importance of the 
survival of each part of the natural system and should temper the proclivity 
of humans towards destroying parts of it.114 Although humans should feel 
morally responsible for maintaining the integrity of marine ecosystems, 
Allison Rieser laments that whales have “become a symbol of human-kind’s 
inability to find common ground and cooperate to protect the global 
environment.”115 “Where we identify values that are both important and 
fragile, we should craft policies that favor their survival.”116 The lack of 
information about whales affects the assessment of the costs and benefits of 
their protection, as well as the consequences of different responses to their 
plight.117 For example, figuring out what a sustainable population of various 
whale species might be can “generate consequences and ramifications that 
 
 110  See Goodman, supra note 83, at 1303 (“[H]umans should treat animals well to enhance 
human welfare.”). 
 111  Callicott, supra note 47, at 15 (noting the practical impediments to quick, humane whale 
hunting techniques).  
 112  See ALDO LEOPOLD, The Land Ethic, in A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC, AND SKETCHES HERE AND 
THERE 201, 214–17 (1949). 
 113  See Callicott, supra note 47, at 8 (“Significantly interfering with poorly understood 
complex population equilibria courts disaster.”); see also J. Barkmann & R. Marggraf, The Long-
Term Protection of Biological Diversity—Lessons from Market Ethics, 3 POIESIS & PRAXIS 3, 6 
(2004) (“Human production and consumption need a number of services—environmental or 
ecosystem services—from nature.”). 
Option benefits stem from values for which it is uncertain to which degree they will be 
actualised in the future. Just from keeping the option of a future benefit, the present 
decision-maker can enjoy an option benefit. Despite the best ecological research we do 
not know all biodiversity and ecosystem services, and we do not always know in time if 
and how we endanger them. As a result, there prevails fundamental ecological 
uncertainty. In turn, these uncertainties result in ecological risks that are at least partly 
unknown today, although potentially catastrophic results may occur. 
See id. 
 114  See id. at 5 (“Of this multitude of potential reasons why biological diversity should be 
protected, its capacity to prevent the break-down of the global life-support systems in an 
unpredictably changing world is particularly important. Safeguarding the global life-support 
systems for this and future generations is a minimum requirement for sustainable development. 
In a ‘morally free zone,’ it is nearly impossible to achieve these objectives. Can we trust upon 
economics to help achieve these objectives?”); see also id. (“Gauthier (1986) argues that a 
perfectly competitive market is a ‘morally free zone.’ Many economists convey an image of 
moral indifference, to put it carefully, who point relentlessly at the ‘economic rationality’ of 
questionable behavior such as free-riding, tax evasion, illegal employment, etc.”). 
 115  Rieser, supra note 49, at 401–02.  
 116  Doremus, supra note 69, at 297. 
 117  Id. at 332. Doremus also notes that “the level of information realistically available simply 
will not support objective choices among possible alternatives, even without the added 
complication of ambiguous goals.” Id.  
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are difficult to foresee,” making it hard to predict the effectiveness of a 
particular solution.118 If the proposed solution is ineffective, then there exists 
the possibility that there might be irreversible environmental harm.119 As 
Doremus observes, “environmental policy choices tend to be sticky, carrying 
lasting consequences that may be difficult to foresee and are certainly 
difficult to reverse.”120 
Being reluctant to interfere in the functioning of an important 
ecosystem is also justified by a moral duty toward future generations121 and 
preserving their “fair access to resources.”122 It is unlikely that future 
generations will “be prepared to accept a deterioration of the environmental 
life-support systems on which they are most likely to depend.”123 Indeed, 
“safeguarding [these] global life-support systems for this and future 
generations is a prime objective and a minimum requirement of sustainable 
development,” because if these systems are lost, “no more human 
production or consumption is possible.”124 Ironically, if the academics’ 
proposal were applied in this context, there would be “nothing left that 
could be exchanged for any profits.”125 
 
 118  Id. at 333. 
 119  Id. (noting that “even theoretically reversible impacts can be practically irreversible”). 
 120  Id.  
 121  See Charles K. Wilber, Book Review, 55 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG., 437, 440–41 (2004) 
(reviewing R.M. Blank & W. McGurn, IS THE MARKET MORAL? A DIALOGUE ON RELIGION, 
ECONOMICS & JUSTICE (2004)):  
A clear illustration is provided by asking what consideration is owed the interests of 
future generations in making decisions today. Of course, the market in most cases is 
blind to such considerations, since it is oriented to the purchasing power of those who 
are alive today. If it is determined that future generations indeed should have some sort 
of moral standing in our deliberations, then we have a failure of the market and some 
kind of intervention (government?) on their behalf may be needed. In instances when 
government intervention is already taken for granted, as in cases in which cost-benefit 
analysis is being used to evaluate a project, the interests or needs of the future represent 
at least an additional factor to be added to the analysis. Assuming that one decides to 
take into account the interests of future generations and that one decides to do so in a 
quantified, utilitarian way, one question that arises is whether and by how much costs 
and benefits in the future should be discounted. There may not be an answer without the 
guidance of philosophic or theological ethics.  
Id.; see also Barkmann & Marggraf, supra note 113, at 3 (“Because the fairness principle of 
market ethics requires that economic agents who cause ‘external’ costs must, at least, 
compensate those who are burdened with these costs, the interests of future generations have 
to be included in responsible economic decision-making.”); id. at 13 (“Negative external effects 
are an ethical problem because there is usually no agreement between the economic agent 
causing the external cost, and the economic ‘patient’ who suffers a loss of benefits.”). 
 122  Curran, supra note 75, at 60.  
 123  Barkmann & Marggraf, supra note 113, at 14. 
 124  Id. at 6. 
 125  Id. see also id. at 9–10 (refuting the notion that “economic agents do not have a moral 
attitude”). Barkmann and Marggraf acknowledge that “future generations are strange, 
anonymous transaction partners with respect to the external effects of today’s production and 
consumption activities.” Id. at 13. They are “unable to send market signals and can not be 
investigated empirically,” nor are their “preferences for market and non-market goods” known 
to present generations. Id. at 13–14. 
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To the extent that there are market ethics, they demand that individuals 
alive today respect the limits of the willingness of future generations to 
trade.126 This means that present generations should “pay particular attention 
to the long-term conservation of biological diversity and to the pro-active 
protection of the capacities of ecological systems to self-regulate and self-
organise which implies safeguarding the long-term function of the main 
biogeochemical processes.”127 While “we cannot force the future to share our 
values,” we can try to be sure that the way in which we deal with 
environmental problems gives the solutions “the temporal durability they 
need” so that “future generations have the opportunity to share our views.”128 
Unfortunately, “[t]he indeterminate nature of environmental problems 
necessarily implies similar indeterminacy about solutions. No finite set of 
possible solutions among which to choose can be universally agreed upon, 
because what counts as a solution depends upon how the problem is 
defined.”129 With respect to whales, inadequate information has led to 
differences of opinion as to what the problem is.130 Additionally, because 
people are more likely to accept information that is consistent with their 
pre-existing views and to reject information that is not, when the 
information on a topic that people feel strongly about is mixed, this can act 
to “polarize[] their views”—which is exactly what has happened on the 
IWC—instead of creating “common ground” for decision-making.131 
I believe these points argue in favor of granting whales full moral worth 
and a right to life—either in their own right, or because of our dependence 
on them, or both. If this conclusion is correct, then harming whales, let alone 
depriving whales of their right to life under any circumstances, is morally 
wrong, thus making the economists’ proposal morally suspect.132 
 
 126  See id. at 14 (“[T]he future ethics derived from market ethics can only demand of an 
individual living today that she respects the limits of the willingness-to-trade of future 
generations without restriction if she has sufficient resources for her own survival.”) 
 127  Id. (citation omitted). 
 128  Doremus, supra note 69, at 329. 
 129  Id. at 332. 
 130  See Lessoff, supra note 59, at 422 (“What data exists [sic] are questionable in many 
aspects, fragmentary, and at best, highly speculative. Information on the marine ecosystem 
necessary for any real understanding of living whales is almost totally lacking.”). In a 1972 
meeting of the IWC, a “selective moratorium” concept called the New Management Procedure 
was introduced: “It was intended to manage whale stocks by utilizing the idea of ‘Maximum 
Sustainable Yield’ (‘MSY’). This program was implemented in 1975 and reduced quotas for 
whales. However, the program was ineffective in preventing the exploitation of whales due to 
poor biological data on whale species and their decline.” Nagtzaam, supra note 16, at 409–10; 
see also Ruffle, supra note 17, at 667 (“[C]urrent methods for ascertaining whale populations 
have proven dangerously inaccurate because the data is subject to individual biases and 
methodological flaws.”). 
 131  Doremus, supra note 69, at 359. Indeed, according to Doremus, the search for “rational” 
decisions is more likely “to entrench starting positions and exacerbate the opposing sides’ 
distrust of one another.” Id. Again, this appears to be the situation with regards to what has 
happened on the IWC. 
 132  Purdy identifies as a “major theme” in any discussion of environmental values a 
“resistance to harming another entity that is recognized as having moral value. This aversion to 
doing harm has organized much of the extension of moral concern to animals, plants, and less 
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A second flaw in the academics’ proposal is their extension of markets 
to a sphere of life where they should not go—namely, to a market 
mechanism that trades in the life of a being with moral worth.133 Like Sandel, 
I would like to resist this “tendency” because it is “by and large a bad 
thing.”134 Sandel objects to extending markets and “market-oriented thinking” 
on two grounds: coercion and corruption.135 Only the latter has relevance 
here. 
Sandel’s corruption objection is based on “the degrading effect of 
market valuation and exchange on certain goods and practices,” such as 
“moral and civic goods.”136 At the heart of the corruption objection is the 
“moral importance of the goods at stake.”137 As he says, “[t]here are, in a 
civilized society, some things that money cannot buy,”138 and commodifying 
 
obvious entities such as species and ecosystems.” Jedediah Purdy, Our Place in the World: A 
new Relationship for Environmental Ethics and Law, (manuscript at 27), available at: 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5179&context=faculty_scholarship. 
 133  See Sandel, supra note 81, at 93 (bemoaning “the extension of markets and market-
oriented thinking to spheres of life once thought to lie beyond their reach”); see also Wilber, 
supra note 121, at 440 (“Free market capitalism fails to provide adequate housing, medical care, 
education, socio-economic security, and meaningful participation in economic life for all 
families, including the poorest. Its unrestrained profit motive results in environmental 
destruction, promotes a soulless consumerism, and destroys the human environment needed by 
a community of persons.”). 
 134  Sandel, supra note 81, at 94. Similarly, Blosser has noted that:  
Economists cannot continue to believe that their models are morally neutral and directly 
lead to accurate policy prescriptions. They must take responsibility for the kinds of 
symbolic universes they create because their voices are important shapers of our 
society. Our government is full of economists and so are the cable news shows. 
Economists shape the symbolic universes of others, and they are responsible for the 
views of the world they teach.  
Blosser, supra note 7, at 455; see also Barkmann & Marggraf, supra note 113, at 18 (“[A] pure 
market solution to cover potentially catastrophic [ecological] risks . . . is doomed to fail.”). 
 135  Sandel, supra note 81, at 93–94. 
 136  See id. (providing as an example the sale of human body parts such as a kidney to argue 
that such “valuation and exchange” violate the sanctity of the human body); see also Blosser, 
supra note 7, at 349 (“As George Stigler once answered his own question—where do economists 
get their ethical systems? My answer is wherever they can find them.” (quoting George J. 
Stigler, The Ethics of Competition: The Friendly Economists 12 (Univ. of Chi. Ctr. for the Study 
of the Econ. & the State, Working Paper No. 12, 1980)), available at 
http://research.chicagobooth.edu/economy/research/articles/12.pdf); Barkmann & Marggraf, 
supra note 113, at 8 (“Safeguarding the global life-support systems for this and future 
generations is a prime objective and a minimum requirement of sustainable development. In a 
‘morally free’ market zone, these objectives and requirements may be impossible to achieve. 
Can economic theory preoccupied with self-interested individuals and oriented towards an ideal 
market system be trusted to help achieve these goals?”).  
 137  Sandel, supra note 81, at 95. 
 138  Id. at 100 (quoting a New Jersey Supreme Court judge in In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 
1249 (N.J. 1988) (referring to the sale of a baby)); see also Doremus, supra note 69, at 323 
(“Opponents [of cost-benefit analysis] . . . argue that some things cannot be meaningfully 
monetized, and that these non-fungible resources will be systematically undervalued if their 
value must be expressed in monetary terms. They also worry that a market model, even one 
that relies on virtual rather than real markets, will shape the way society values those things.”). 
 
TOJCI.BABCOCK – NEW ABSTRACT 2/23/2013  1:10 PM 
2013] PUTTING A PRICE ON WHALES TO SAVE THEM 21 
such goods degrades them “by using them as instruments of profit.”139 This 
objection, Sandel says, is intrinsic to the good itself because it cannot be 
remedied by changing “the background conditions within which market 
exchanges take place.”140 Here, killing a being with moral worth and an 
entitlement to life degrades the intrinsic value of that good, and this problem 
cannot be remedied by changing the way the market works as long as it is 
necessary for a whale to die. Sandel does not argue that commodifying 
certain goods or practices should be legally prohibited, but merely argues 
that it can be “morally objectionable.”141 However, “[t]he moral status of a 
contested commodity should figure as one consideration among others in 
determining its legal permissibility.”142 
Looking at the moral worth of a good to determine whether it should be 
part of a market exchange does not require determining that good’s 
monetary value, but rather determining “what mode of valuation is fitting or 
appropriate to that good.”143 In other words, it requires determining the 
good’s intrinsic worth—something markets are not designed to do.144 
Quantification of objects is necessary for a market economy to work,145 and 
quantifying an object with intrinsic value, like moral worth, creates 
problems for markets because it has no other features that can be 
monetized.146 Here, the good being exchanged is not just a whale with an 
external commercial value, but a whale imbued with intrinsic moral worth, 
the sale of which under the academics’ proposal will “diminish” or “corrupt” 
its character.147 There is no external value that can be put on a whale’s moral 
worth any more than value can be ascribed to a human’s moral worth. 
Sandel also argues that the corruption objection to using a market in 
certain circumstances “call[s] into question” a basic tenet of “market-
oriented thinking” that “all goods are commensurable, that all goods can be 
 
 139  Sandel, supra note 81, at 100; see also Blosser, supra note 7, at 368 (“[Adam] Smith is 
absolutely right to worry about the extent to which the commercial life isolates and erodes the 
moral sentiments.”). 
 140  Sandel, supra note 81, at 95; see also Doremus, supra note 69, at 326 (“No individual 
could similarly modify the market to align the incentives of market participants with 
environmental costs or benefits.”). 
 141  Id. at 96.  
 142  Id. 
 143  Id. at 101. 
 144  See id. 
 145  See Curran, supra note 75, at 77 (“[S]ome quantification is required for a market 
economy to operate. The market economy is recognised as being an efficient and flexible 
method of providing this quantification and enabling allocation of resources to meet individual 
needs and preferences.”). In contrast, “[l]egal and moral concepts such as rights assumed the 
importance of things independent of any satisfaction of human preferences.” Purdy, supra note 
1, at 865. 
 146  See Curran, supra note 75, at 59 (“The very term, ‘intrinsic value’ exacerbates this 
conflict; Black’s Law Dictionary defines intrinsic value as ‘the inherent value of a thing, without 
any special features that might alter its market value.’” (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1587 
(8th ed. 2004))). 
 147  Sandel, supra note 81, at 104. 
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translated without loss into a single measure or unit of value.”148 A common 
criticism of cost benefit analysis149 is that it forces the reduction of multiple 
values into a single numeric value.150 While quantitative criteria “promise 
transparency, predictability and consistency,” and “offer confidence that 
neutral principles, rather than personal biases of the decision maker or other 
extraneous factors” control decisions,151 regrettably, according to Doremus, 
these “appeals to objectivity are frequently disingenuous, misguided, or 
both.”152 There is simply no “objectively right or wrong answer” to the whale 
problem.153 This search for “objective certainty is more likely to produce 
paralysis than improved policy decisions,”154 which appears to be exactly 
what has happened with respect to whales, as each side searches for 
 
 148  Id.; see also Blosser, supra note 7, at 374 (“[T]he particular danger of economic power 
[is] that the ‘technological imperative—because we can, we should—risks reducing everything 
to instrumental value, to price, in the pursuit of technological goods as a final value.’ Human 
power is a perennial concern of Schweiker’s and he warns in words reminiscent of Troeltsch 
that ‘the radical extension of human power in our time threatens to overwhelm moral reason, 
making all moral reflection instrumental to the simple purpose of furthering human power.’ 
What we need today is a morality that does not buckle under the human quest for power but 
makes such specialized economic power responsive to theological, political, and social values.” 
(quoting WILLIAM SCHWEIKER, RESPONSIBILITY AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS 27 (1995))); Wilber, supra 
note 121, at 440 (“Social scientists, including economists, do need to understand that a 
conception of virtuous living needs to be revived in the public debate over workable policies.”). 
 149  Another criticism of cost-benefit analysis leveled by Lawrence Tribe is that it turns 
“obligation into self-interest.” Laurence Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New 
Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L. J. 1315, 1331 (1974); see also Barkmann & 
Marggraf, supra note 113, at 19 (noting that each development project creates “an incremental loss 
of ecosystem potential to adapt to challenging environmental conditions,” and the ability of an 
ecosystem “to self-organise is progressively diminished,” and recommending that “[t]his loss of an 
insurance value should be included in [cost-benefit analysis],” which “will make environmentally 
damaging projects more difficult to justify economically”). For these reasons Barkmann and 
Marggraf recommend the adoption of a “safe minimum standard” to protect ecosystems, noting 
that the use of such a standard “does not allow for a computational compensation in monetary 
terms” because such compensation “[is] of little help in this worst case of global change.” Id. at 18. 
 150  See Aagaard, supra note 80, at 1543 (“Cost-benefit analysis involves inventorying the 
consequences of a decision option, monetizing the consequences, and then aggregating 
monetized values to produce a net value of the option . . . . [I]t is cost-benefit analysis’s 
insistence that policy effects ‘should be aligned along a single numerical metric . . . that often 
forces the [cost-benefit] analyst to adopt methods of quantification and monetization that 
attract criticism.’” (quoting Douglas A. Kysar, It Might Have Been: Risk, Precaution and 
Opportunity Costs, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 17 (2006))); see also Tribe, supra note 149, at 
1325–26 (objecting to cost benefit analysis because, while it can accommodate different types 
of values, it treats “individual need and desire as the ultimate frame of reference”); Purdy, supra 
note 1 (manuscript at 16) (noting that “[c]ost-benefit analysis also achieved a certain kind of 
neutrality by rendering competing values into a single currency at a time when neutrality’s value 
was on the rise”). Purdy also notes that “[l]egal and moral concepts such as rights assumed that 
rights holders mattered, regardless of whether their existence satisfied any human preferences.” 
Id. at 865. 
 151  Doremus, supra note 69, at 330. 
 152  Id. at 331. 
 153  Id. To make matters worse, “observers with different perspectives and values describe 
[environmental problems] very differently.” Id. This is one reason Doremus describes 
environmental problems as “wicked.” Id. 
 154  Id. at 334. 
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definitive, scientific support for its position.155 The emphasis on value-neutral 
information is also a way of “sweeping” a discussion about values “under the 
rug,” an approach that “systematically favors a particular, utilitarian 
perspective, which may not accurately reflect societal ethical intuitions.”156 
According to Doremus, “there is substantial evidence that the existence 
and form of markets, which are framed by law, affect the development of 
societal values, tastes, and preferences.”157 This means that a market in 
whale shares could have a powerful influence on those values. The 
academics’ proposal is even more problematic from a broader societal 
perspective in light of Doremus’ insight—that markets, which act to “frame 
problems and choices,” can “contribute to perceptions of entitlement and 
fairness . . . [and] encourage the exercise of self-regarding, rather than other-
regarding, preferences.”158 
To distinguish between goods that can be exchanged in a market place, 
Sandel relies on two factors: “moral intuition” and some “conception of the 
good” in situations when the commodification of that good is “morally 
contested.”159 Sandel might argue that the “good” here is a life, the corruption 
or degradation of which cannot be allowed. Just as selling people (e.g., 
slavery) is morally unacceptable, so too is trading in the lives of animals that 
possess moral worth. As Sandel says, there are “dimensions of life that lie 
beyond consent, in the moral and civic goods that markets do not honor and 
money cannot buy.”160 
Finding the academics’ proposal morally wanting still begs the question: 
how can whales be protected? This Essay suggests that the answer lies in 
norms. Norms informally guide people in what is socially correct behavior, 
and, therefore, may offer an effective alternative to both the flawed 
international regulatory regime and the academics’ morally suspect 
proposal.161 Norm-forcing holds appeal because “internalized norms can 
provide efficient decentralized mechanisms for governing behavior,”162 which 
can be particularly useful when there is no centralized governmental support 
for the behavioral change, as is the case in most whaling countries like 
 
 155  See Lessoff, supra note 59, at 422 (“[W]haling nations exploited the differences of 
opinion which existed in the scientific community to justify continued whaling practices.”); see 
also id. at 421–22 (“[A]lthough many nations demanded more research be performed prior to the 
imposition of a moratorium or quotas limiting the harvesting of specific types of whales, this 
research was rarely accomplished. To exacerbate the problem, current scientific methods used 
to determine the viability of the whale stocks were imprecise and often inaccurate, and thus, 
there was little in the way of scientific support for the imposition of such restrictions.”). 
 156  Doremus, supra note 69, at 298. 
 157  Id. at 310. 
 158  Id. Doremus also notes that by providing rewards like payments, markets can decrease 
the intrinsic pleasure people receive from engaging in voluntary activities. Id. 
 159  Sandel, supra note 81, at 107. 
 160  Id. at 122. 
 161  See Barkmann & Marggraf, supra note 113, at 11 (“[P]urely self-interested individuals 
comply with general social norms, with the rules of market ethics, or with the ecological long-
term interests of future generations.”). 
 162  Doremus, supra note 69, at 313. 
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Japan.163 Behavioral change can “lead indirectly to changes in values as 
people internalize the new norms.”164 Norms also cost little to enforce, as 
citizens under their influence “will impose sanctions on themselves, 
ensuring perfect detection and punishment.”165 
While some norms, such as the duty to maintain biodiversity and 
protect species from extinction, have gained the status of becoming 
customary international law,166 this is not true for the whale preservation 
norm. The continuing controversy over commercial whaling on the IWC and 
the use of exemptions allowing whales to be killed show the lack of 
universal acceptance of such a norm and why it is not yet customary 
international law. However, there is a growing international consciousness 
that killing whales is morally repugnant, which is an indication of an 
emergent international whale preservation norm.167 That consciousness is 
apparent from the fact that only a few countries adhere to a different 
norm.168 Collectively, the refusal of those countries to hunt whales manifests 
an international awareness of a legal obligation towards whales—perhaps 
even of the existence of a right to life with commensurate legal and moral 
obligations owed by humanity.169 If this emerging international whale 
preservation norm could be successfully dispersed to whaling countries, it 
might move the citizens of those countries to undertake actions that protect 
whales without requiring the sacrifice of whales to save them. 
 
 163  See Hirata, supra note 46, at 146 (“Japan has virtually no legislative advocates for the 
antiwhaling cause and no legislative supporter of antiwhaling activism.”). 
 164  Doremus, supra note 69, at 313–14. 
 165  Id. at 313; see also Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 
947, 957 (1997); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 338, 368–69 (1997). 
 166  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 102(2) (1987) (“Customary international law results from a general and consistent 
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”). 
 167  See D’Amato & Chopra, supra note 18, at 22–23 (“This essay examines the history, and 
argues for the ‘presentiation,’ of a broadening international consciousness about whaling 
amounting to an opinio juris—the psychological component of international customary law. 
When this component is added to the evolving practices of states toward whaling, the 
combination of psychological and material elements arguably constitutes binding customary 
law. The dynamic element of that custom and its underlying philosophy generate, we conclude, 
an emergent entitlement of whales—not just ‘on behalf of’’ whales—to a life of their own.”); see 
also Nagtzaam, supra note 16, at 447; Robert L. Friedheim, Introduction: The IWC as a 
Contested Regime, in TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE WHALING REGIME 9 (Robert L. Friedheim ed., 
2001) (“The preservation norm has gone through a ‘tipping point’ [in the whaling community] 
and has ‘cascaded’ throughout the world community, and all that needs to be done is to have it 
‘internalised’ by the peoples and governments of the world.”). 
 168  See supra notes 47–54 and accompanying text (describing the refusal of certain whaling 
countries to comply with the IWC moratorium); see also infra notes 177–79 and accompanying 
text (noting that these countries persist in challenging the moratorium at every annual IWC 
meeting).  
 169  Nations that maintain a contrary position in the face of such an emerging universal norm 
threaten to undercut the nature of international law as a reflection of general norms that bind 
states. See D’Amato & Chopra, supra note 18, at 56 (“If any state could claim sovereign rights in 
the teeth of an international norm to the contrary, international law (as a set of general norms 
binding on states) would not exist.”). 
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However, diffusion of a whale preservation norm is complicated by the 
existence of another whale norm—the whale conservation norm, which 
emphasizes the wise use and conservation of natural resources.170 This norm 
finds wide support in many different cultures because it is a “utilitarian, 
human-centered perspective that seeks the greatest good for the greatest 
number of humans.”171 Pro-whaling countries like the whale conservation 
norm because it supports their goal of resuming whale hunts once 
sustainable populations are reached.172 Although the whale preservation 
norm, which has a non-instrumentalist view of whales,173 appears to be 
ascending on the international stage, the IWC has not yet adopted it because 
of the disagreement among the anti-whaling members over which whale 
norm should prevail.174 This norm stalemate has neutralized the IWC as a 
force for wider norm change. It is unlikely to change any time soon given the 
fact that both sides are buoyed by other national cultural norms and moral 
beliefs. 
In addition, even though the ban against commercial whale hunting is 
“reasonably understood and adhered to” by most nations,175 the whale 
preservation norm is a weak behavioral guide for those not inclined to 
follow it. Its weakness is apparent from the fact that whales are still being 
killed pursuant to scientific research permits and by aboriginal subsistence 
hunters, despite the questionable scientific and anthropological basis for 
those exemptions.176 Other indications of the weakness and questionable 
durability of the whale preservation norm include the persistent violation of 
the ban by a number of countries;177 the fact that its continuation is 
challenged at every annual IWC meeting;178 and that the major whaling 
nation, Japan, has threatened to set up a rival organization based on 
sustainable use—the conservation norm—if the ban is not repealed.179 While 
 
 170  Nagtzaam, supra note 16, at 386–88. 
 171  Id. at 387. 
 172  Id. at 423. 
 173  Id. at 388. 
 174  In this, the whale conservation norm is consistent with “[o]ld, influential constituencies 
support[ing] [use of] natural resources for economic profit” in many countries, including the 
United States. Purdy, supra note 1, at 880; see also Blosser, supra note 7, at 448 (noting that “the 
power of the ‘dismal science’ that assumes humans are self-interested utility maximizers results 
from the reality that all too often humans act the way economists predict”). 
 175  Nagtzaam, supra note 16, at 444. 
 176  See D’Amato & Chopra, supra note 18, at 62 (finding “little justification for current claims 
of whaling for scientific research, and only a prima facie justification of whaling for aboriginal 
subsistence needs”). 
 177  See Ruffle, supra note 17, at 658 (“[M]any violations are unnoticed or under-reported and 
essentially unpunished on an international level.”). 
 178  See Nagtzaam, supra note 16, at 420 (“While preservationism is now ascendant, it hangs 
by a slim thread that is challenged yearly at IWC meetings by those seeking to roll back the 
ban.”); see also Erik Jaap Molenaar, Marine Mammals: The Role of Ethics and Ecosystem 
Considerations, 6 J. INTL. WILDLIFE L. & POL’Y 31, 42 (2003) (“The 55th Annual Meeting of the 
IWC (2003) once again gave rise to speculations about a competitor of the IWC.”). 
 179  See Nagtzaam, supra note 16, at 446 (“Japan seems to be losing faith in the process 
altogether . . . and it threatened to quit the IWC and to set up an alternative organization based 
on sustainable utilization.”); see also North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission, Agreement 
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a norm against animal cruelty might be deployed in support of a whale 
preservation norm, considering the cruelty of whale hunting, there is 
nonetheless no international animal welfare norm. Even though the majority 
of member nations at the IWC are concerned about the cruelty of whaling, 
the organization’s reluctance to stop whale hunting stems from the equal 
desire to preserve aboriginal subsistence hunting, despite its cruelty.180 A 
weak animal welfare norm has not been able to defeat a strong aboriginal 
subsistence norm on the global stage, and the exception for subsistence 
hunting shows no sign of disappearing.181 So it is highly unlikely that a 
whaling country will spontaneously adopt the whale preservation norm, 
since all it would gain would be international reputational benefits, which 
might not be sufficient to offset domestic opposition to the change.182 
Since norms are “constructed through shared understandings”183 about 
what constitutes good behavior, “a new social meaning . . . must be created” 
about the activity in question for a new norm to be adopted.184 When social 
understandings change, the institutions and rules that depend on them 
change as well.185 Most times, these changes happen imperceptibly because 
they occur “against a backdrop of shared understandings and social 
institutions that give them meaning and anchor them in the shared reality of 
 
on Cooperation in Research, Conservation and Management of Marine Mammals in the North 
Atlantic, Apr. 9, 1992, Vol. 1945, I-33321, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/ 
publication/unts/volume 1945/volume-1945-i-33321-english.pdf (describing treaty between 
Norway, Greenland, Iceland, and the Faroe Islands). 
 180  See Peter J. Stoett, Of Whales and People: Normative Theory, Symbolism, and the IWC, 8 
INT’L J. WILDLIFE L. & POL’Y 151, 170 (2005) (“But an intense ethical question arises regarding the 
aboriginal hunts: The more traditional-style hunts were almost certainly agonizing affairs for the 
whales involved, involving hours of bleeding.”). 
 181  Indeed, the IWC recently increased the whaling quotas for aboriginal peoples in the 
United States, Russia, St. Vincent, and the Grenadines and extended the quotas until 2012. See 
Erin Loury, Controversial Caribbean Whaling Approved with U.S., Russian Aboriginal Hunts, 
L.A. TIMES, July 4, 2012, http://www.latimes.com/news/local/environment/la-me-gs-controversial-
caribbean-whaling-approved-with-us-russian-aboriginal-hunts-20120704,0,2970 
925.story (last visited Dec. 29, 2012).  
 182  Compliance with a norm legitimizes an actor, giving her credibility and status—the affect of 
being a good citizen; noncompliance makes her an outcast. This affect can extend to countries as 
well. See Nagtzaam, supra note 16, at 432 (commenting on how Japan’s noncompliance with the 
whale preservation norms makes it stand out “as the exception that proves the norm, which is 
becoming more deeply entrenched among IWC members”). Once norms are internalized, they can 
guide behavior without outside interference. Until then they can be informally enforced through 
measures like shaming. See id. at 378; see also Hope M. Babcock, Assuming Personal 
Responsibility for Improving the Environment: Moving Toward a New Environmental Norm, 33 
HARV. ENVTL. L.. REV. 117, 134 (2009) (“Norms are informal obligations or social rules that are not 
dependent on government either for their creation or enforcement.”). 
 183  See Jaye Ellis, Fisheries Conservation in an Anarchical System: A Comparison of 
Rational Choice and Constructivist Perspectives, J. INT’L L & INT’L REL., 2007, at 1, 14 (discussing 
how categories of ocean spaces “are social constructions, created through densely layered 
shared understandings and subject to change as those shared understanding begin to shift”). 
 184  Babcock, supra note 182, at 146. 
 185  See Wilber, supra note 121, at 440 (“[McGurn] goes on to argue: ‘To change laws in any 
meaningful sense we must first do what Wilberforce and Wesley did in Britain over slavery: change 
minds.’ And change hearts I might add.” (quoting William McGurn, Creative Virtues of the 
Economy, in IS THE MARKET MORAL? A DIALOGUE ON RELIGION, ECONOMICS, AND JUSTICE 142 (2004)). 
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the various interested actors.”186 This was the case with the emergence of the 
anti-whaling norm in western countries, which coincided with a general 
surge in environmental consciousness in those countries.187 However, 
changing norms is not easy, especially when it means abandoning previously 
acceptable behavior long-practiced—which is the case in whaling 
countries.188 
To the extent that norms guide people into behaving in ways that 
conform to community expectations, such expectations in pro-whaling 
countries will have to change first. This can be done by changing the 
salience of the new norm in the targeted country. For the whale preservation 
norm to be salient and exert any prescriptive pressure on the behavior of 
whaling nations, the adopting country must perceive it to be legitimate and 
widely held. However, the acceptance of a whale preservation norm is not 
universal, especially given the popularity of the competing whale 
conservation norm, and its legitimacy is open to question, considering the 
recovery of many whale species and the non-threatened status of the 
commonly-hunted minke whales.189 On the other hand, proponents of the 
whale preservation norm have fundamentally changed how the world thinks 
about whale hunting. So, although the whale preservation norm is not yet 
strong enough to be part of a new cultural identity in whaling nations, it is 
robust at the international level where it has in all likelihood reached a 
“tipping point,” making its reversal unlikely.190 Moreover, internalization of 
 
 186  Ellis, supra note 183, at 39. 
 187  See, e.g., Cinnamon Pinon Carlarne, Saving the Whales in the New Millennium: 
International Institutions, Recent Developments and the Future of International Whaling 
Policies, 24 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 1, 6–8 (2005) (discussing how increased environmental awareness 
and international cooperation led to international efforts to oppose whaling).  
 188  See Doremus, supra note 69, at 314 (“It seems likely that true value-forcing would work 
only incrementally; the mere enactment of a law is unlikely to undermine strongly held core 
values or to deter behavior that provides a strong financial or other benefit.”).  
 189  See Detsky, supra note 47, at 37 (“Some whale populations have experienced the largest 
reward the [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea] could offer—a recovery from 
near extinction.”); see also Nagtzaam, supra note 16, at 407 (“[W]hen nations like Japan were 
able to argue plausibly that there was no threat of extinction of certain species (such as minke 
whales), anti-whaling states and ENGOs shifted ground to argue that it was simply unethical to 
kill whales.”). But see Callicott, supra note 47, at 21 (“[I]f, standing upon a venerable tradition of 
whaling, the Norwegian government feels justified in flouting international agreements and 
allowing its citizens to kill the number of minke whales that it believes to be sustainable, surely 
the governments of Iceland, Russia, Portugal, Brazil, South Africa, Japan, and all the other 
countries with a whaling ‘tradition’ will soon feel equally justified in doing the same thing. This 
presents another slippery slope of which to be wary. If the number of minke whales killed 
annually by Norwegians is sustainable, what happens when other governments, following 
Norway’s lead, unilaterally allot comparable catch limits to their would-be whalers? At the 
bottom of this slippery slope lies the tragedy of the commons.”). 
 190  See Friedheim, supra note 167 (“The preservation norm has gone through a ‘tipping 
point’ [in the whaling community] and has ‘cascaded’ throughout the world community, and all 
that needs to be done is to have it ‘internalised’ by the peoples and governments of the world.”); 
Nagtzaam, supra note 16, at 447; see also, Doremus, supra note 69, at 313 (“Under the right 
circumstances, a relatively small nudge of publicity can set off a ‘norm cascade,’ ‘tipping’ 
society to a new equilibrium, in which a much larger proportion of people acts on, or perhaps 
has internalized, the norm in question.”); Babcock, supra note 182, at 143 (discussing how a 
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the whale preservation norm by countries like the United States, Australia, 
France, and the Netherlands have made them powerful proponents for 
further norm change on the global stage.191 
Wider diffusion of a new norm also depends on the cultural 
characteristics of the target society and the extent to which it “resonates 
with domestic values.”192 The whale preservation norm does not resonate at 
all with the cultural values of a country like Japan, which sees itself as a 
whale-eating nation,193 even though the country’s taste for whale meat is a 
post–World War II phenomenon.194 The Japanese have no particular affinity 
for whales and certainly no belief in their entitlement to life.195 Killing whales 
is also consistent with the high value Japan places on protecting its 
traditional coastal communities,196 and with other strong norms they adhere 
to, such as the nationalism norm.197 On the other hand, any cultural 
dissonance from adopting the whale preservation norm by a whaling country 
might be overcome if it is seen as representing a higher norm, like the animal 
welfare norm. Killing whales, which is unquestionably cruel,198 is not 
consistent with Japan’s strong support of a domestic anti-animal cruelty 
 
“tipping point” occurs when a “critical mass” of other actors “become norm leaders and adopt 
new norms”). 
 191  See, e.g., PETER J. STOETT, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF WHALING 66 (1997) (“Australia’s 
delegation, pushed by domestic opposition, slowly turned to oppose commercial whaling.”); id. at 
85 (“Since the early 1970s, the United States has presented a consistent anti-whaling policy to the 
world.”); id. at 90–91 (noting that, although “European states are as a whole opposed to whaling,” 
France and the Netherlands have been particularly vocal opponents).  
 192  Hirata, supra note 46, at 141; see also Doremus, supra note 69, at 315 (“Values are at least 
as likely to be molded by the characteristics of the physical, institutional, and social world that 
law creates as they are to be determined by law’s messages.”). 
 193  See Doremus, supra note 69, at 314 (“Laws that run counter to deeply ingrained norms or 
values are likely to prove spectacular failures. Widespread violation could signal that the law 
does not reflect a genuine consensus, encouraging even more violation. That cascade would not 
only undermine the expressive value of the law in questions, it might even threaten to 
undermine the general norm of compliance with law.”). Doremus also notes that while “law may 
be useful in strengthening weakly held values, or in pushing the undecided toward one of a pair 
of closely contested values,” “value forcing is likely to be slow, since children are probably 
more susceptible to inculcation with new values than their parents.” Id. 
 194  See Hirata, supra note 46, at 141 (noting “the eating of whale only became commonplace 
in Japan after World War II”). 
 195  See id. at 141–42 (“[M]ost Japanese lack any special affinity for whales and disagree with 
Western animal rights activists who insist on whales’ rights.”). 
 196  See Osherenko, supra note 47, at 228 (“[A]rtisanal whaling holds cultural, religious, and 
social importance for Japanese coastal communities.”). 
 197  See Hirata, supra note 46, at 149 (“Militant action against the Japanese government, 
through the physical blockage of whaling vessels or shaming campaigns, may backfire, 
strengthening the nationalist sentiments of the Japanese public and policy makers.”). 
 198  See Callicott, supra note 47, at 15 (“It can also be appreciated that, as a matter of fact, in 
more than half of all cases the whale’s death is prolonged and its agony proportionately 
protracted. Thus, for reasons not of logical but of practical necessity, whaling violates the first 
land ethical rule of respect for nonhuman fellow-members of the biotic community. It is 
inherently inhumane for more than half the minke whales taken.”). 
TOJCI.BABCOCK – NEW ABSTRACT 2/23/2013  1:10 PM 
2013] PUTTING A PRICE ON WHALES TO SAVE THEM 29 
norm199—a reality that might provide an opening wedge for eventual norm 
change. The homogeneity of whaling countries like Japan, Norway, and 
Iceland might also make adoption of an anti-whaling norm by those 
countries easier, as well as the decrease in importance of the whaling 
industries.200 
However, if pro-whaling countries feel that the anti-whaling countries 
are pressuring them to adopt a new whaling norm, then a countervailing 
norm like the autonomy norm201 may prevent its adoption. Alternatively, if 
Japan or Norway believes they are being treated unfairly—for example, if 
nonconforming behavior by anti-whaling countries (like eating meat) is not 
sanctioned, or traditional hunting by the Inuit is acceptable, but hunting by 
Japanese coastal villages is not—then the reciprocity norm may diminish 
any desire a whaling nation has to adopt the whale preservation norm.202 
Putting pressure on a pro-whaling nation to conform to a whale preservation 
norm may also be viewed as showing disrespect for divergent cultures and 
could undermine the IWC’s credibility if it were the source of the pressure.203 
Since maintenance of any norm requires informal enforcement before it is 
internalized, it is unlikely that will occur if whaling countries feel they have 
been forced to comply with the new norm. 
Still, it may be possible to change the preferences of whaling nations by 
changing the preferences of their citizens.204 Thus, if a preference is held only 
by a few and not deeply felt, then its strength is limited and a different 
preference might be possible. Should such a change start to happen in a 
whaling country, it could create a cascade of changed behavior in that 
country—a phenomenon that has already happened internationally, as more 
and more people have abandoned the old whale hunting norm and adopted 
 
 199  See Gillespie, supra note 53, at 18 (“[Legislation in Japan] suggest[s] laws are necessary 
‘to engender a feeling of love for animals among the people, thereby contributing to the 
development of respect for life and sentiments of amity and peace.’”).  
 200  See Hirata, supra note 46, at 140 (“Whaling is a minor industry in Japan today, with only 
the slightest impact on the Japanese economy: The coastal whaling industry is dwindling, and 
the scientific whaling programs are not-for-profit, as the money generated from the sale of 
whale meat under the programs is used to cover the cost of the research.”). 
 201  See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms in 
Corporate Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 55, 99–101 (2003) (noting that, according to the 
autonomy norm, individuals should be free from government intervention, unless circumstances 
indicate that they have done, or will do, a blameworthy activity). “[I]f people adhere to . . . the 
‘autonomy norm,’ they may be less likely to increase their compliance in response to threatened 
formal legal sanctions.” Babcock, supra note 182, at 152. Such sanctions may instead embolden 
their resolve to continue their activities, especially if they view them as important. 
 202  Babcock, supra note 182, at 152 (discussing the autonomy and reciprocity norms). 
 203  See Osherenko, supra note 47, at 235 (“The costs and negative consequences of the 
moratorium fall unjustly on those who are marginalized.”). 
 204  Cf. Wilber, supra note 121, at 440 (“McGurn goes on to argue: ‘To change laws in any 
meaningful sense we must first do what Wilberforce and Wesley did in Britain over slavery: 
change minds.’ And change hearts I might add.” (quoting McGurn, supra note 185)); see also 
Doremus, supra note 69, at 307 (“Preferences and values are known to be malleable. They can 
be shaped deliberately, through advertising or similar techniques.”). 
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the new whale preservation norm.205 Making the public aware of the issues 
involved in whaling, such as its cruelty, might change individual preferences 
and help a whale preservation norm emerge in whaling countries. So Japan’s 
aversion to animal cruelty and domestic adoption of the anti-animal cruelty 
norm might help spread the anti-whaling norm in that country, even though 
that norm is weak within the IWC and elsewhere. 
Limiting subsidies and exemptions for environmentally harmful 
activities can reduce “entrenchment” around a particular set of values and 
behavior.206 For example, changes to incentive structures, like rewarding 
restaurants that do not offer whale meat or penalizing those that do, might 
change individual preferences,207 such as a taste for whale meat. Similarly, 
eliminating any subsidy of the whaling industry208 might discourage the 
continuation of whaling. However, it is unlikely that the Japanese 
government will do either of these things, as it is generally unresponsive to 
anti-whaling constituencies.209 This also means that domestic 
nongovernmental organizations will not function as norm leaders to drive 
norm change in their countries, while the continuing problems at the IWC 
make it unlikely that it will serve as a force for norm change in whaling 
nations. 
Thus, it will fall to international environmental nongovernmental 
organizations (ENGOs) to secure norm change in whaling countries. These 
 
 205  See Babcock, supra note 182, at 145 (discussing how a “norm cascade” changes majority 
preferences, eliminating any need for external pressure to adopt the norm). 
 206  Doremus, supra note 69, at 376. 
 207  An interesting empirical study was done by Julian Rode, Robin M. Hogarth, and Marc Le 
Menestrel, in which they looked at the willingness of consumers to pay more for ethically 
differentiated products and found that they were, especially when they lack information about the 
amount of the additional costs incurred by ethical producers. See generally JULIAN RODE, ROBIN M. 
HOGARTH, & MARC LE MENESTREL, ETHICAL DIFFERENTIATION AND MARKET BEHAVIOR: AN 
EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH (2006), available at http://www.econ.upf.edu/docs/papers/ 
downloads/779.pdf. But see Hope M. Babcock, Responsible Environmental Behavior, Energy 
Conservation, and Compact Fluorescent Bulbs: You Can Lead a Horse to Water But Can You Make 
It Drink?, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 943, 968–74 (2009) (discussing the regressive impact on lower 
income individuals that can result when consumers are offered certain economic incentives). For 
further discussion on the topic of using incentives and other motivational techniques to change 
behavior, see also Doremus, supra note 69, at 307 (“[B]y communicating, directly or indirectly, 
society’s endorsement of particular values, law reinforces those values among members of the 
present generation. It also subtly encourages their adoption by succeeding generations.”), and see 
generally Babcock, supra (discussing the use of incentives to encourage consumers to switch to 
compact fluorescent light bulbs).  
 208  See Anthony L.I. Moffa, Comment, Two Competing Models of Activism, One Goal: A Case 
Study of Anti-Whaling Campaigns in the Southern Ocean, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 201, 209 (2012) 
(“[The] Japanese government . . . very heavily subsidizes the whaling operations under JARPA II 
[the Plan for the Second Phase of the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special Permit 
in the Antarctic].”). 
 209  See Hirata, supra note 46, at 148 (“Japan’s refusal to adopt the antiwhaling norm is 
explained in terms of its domestic cultural and political structures. Because the norm does not 
fit well into the domestic value system, antiwhaling advocates have not been able to create a 
social movement that is strong enough to force the ministry’s hand. Also, the political structure 
keeps these antiwhaling advocates marginalized, thus making it extremely difficult for them to 
influence bureaucratic views or policy.”). 
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groups have been extremely effective in mobilizing world opinion against 
whaling,210 and have played a major role in moving the IWC to a 
preservationist position.211 International ENGOs organized the first 
international efforts to stop whale hunting,212 and caused the abrupt end to 
the 2011 Japanese whaling season.213 Their attendance at IWC meetings, 
where they often outnumber members,214 has enabled them to make public 
statements opposing whaling and has put members on notice that they are 
watching how the IWC performs. Their immunity from domestic political 
pressure makes them more effective at enforcing international norms and 
putting pressure on noncompliant states and industries through tactics like 
consumer boycotts and intervention in whale hunts.215 
International ENGOs have increased the pressure on whaling nations to 
give up whaling by specifically publicizing the cruelty of whale hunts.216 
Through information and direct action campaigns, they have been chipping 
away at the utility calculus that favors whaling in those countries. They have 
cornered the international emotional market by using words like whale 
“slaughter” as opposed to “harvest,” dramatically shaping the global 
 
 210  See, e.g., McCurry, supra note 8 (reporting that Amazon eliminated whale meat products 
from its Japanese website in response to thousands of email messages protesting their sale). A 
recent example of the successful application of pressure being brought against a whaling country 
is the recent reversal by South Korea to resume lethal scientific research of whales. See S. Korea 
Says It May Abandon Research Whaling Plan, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 11, 2012, http://bigstory. 
ap.org/article/skorea-says-it-may-abandon-research-whaling-plan (last visited Feb. 15, 2013) 
(describing the protests from environmental groups and non-whaling countries who suspected 
that the plan was just a front for resuming commercial whaling).  
 211  See Nagtzaam, supra note 16, at 406 (“Any understanding of the shift in the IWC’s 
operating norm must account for the role played by ENGOs, who in the 1970s pushed a 
preservationist agenda both within the IWC and to the global society in general.”).  
 212  See Ruffle, supra note 17, at 669 (“NGOs are credited with initiating the first worldwide 
campaign to stop the slaughter of whales.”). 
 213  See Moffa, supra note 208, at 202 (“[N]ews of the abrupt end of the Japanese whaling 
season demonstrates that environmental NGOs now have the ability to compel compliance with 
international commitments through unilateral action.”). 
 214  See Nagtzaam, supra note 16, at 407 (“By the early 1980s, over fifty ENGOs were 
represented at the IWC in an effort to influence debates, either by persuasion, by direct action, 
or by putting states on notice that the constituents they represented were watching.”); see also 
Stuart R. Harrop, From Cartel to Conservation and on to Compassion: Animal Welfare and the 
International Whaling Commission, 6 J. INT’L. WILDLIFE L. & POL’Y 79, 85 (2003) (“[A]t many 
meetings of the IWC there are more than twice as many NGO’s present as state members.”). 
 215  See Nagtzaam, supra note 16, at 418 (“[M]any non-whaling states supported a 
moratorium because of domestic political pressure to appease voters who, thanks to the ENGO 
publicity campaign, perceived whaling as a morally repugnant activity. Voting for the 
moratorium cost domestic governments little strategically and appeased domestic voters.”). 
 216  See id. at 406 (“ENGOs . . . were able to tap into, articulate, and publicize the Western 
public’s horrific response to whaling. Their tactics were to use mostly peaceful protests and 
public information campaigns to highlight the brutality of whaling and its impact on whale 
species and persuade the global populace to end whale hunting and reframe the debate from 
one of exploitation or conservation to one of preserving all whales in perpetuity.”); 
 see also Blosser, supra note 7, at 427 (“[Adam] Smith believes a well skilled and informed 
person can best aid the interests of humanity by making good choices in her own neck of the 
woods. If he were alive these days, he might have a ‘Think Global—Act Local’ bumper sticker 
on his car.”). 
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perception of whaling. However, the confrontational and often violent 
tactics employed by groups like Sea Shepherds,217 while attention garnering, 
could be counterproductive in a country like Japan where it might trigger 
the country’s nationalism norm in support of whaling.218 At the international 
level, the reluctance to prosecute these groups for violations of international 
law may indicate a societal calculation that the benefits of the their tactics 
outweigh the costs, since they may help stop a practice the international 
community largely condemns but has been unable to curb.219 
One other thing favoring a norm change in whaling countrie, like Japan 
is that their whaling industries are very small and shrinking.220 Therefore, the 
adoption of an anti-whaling norm in those countries could gain them 
international goodwill at little cost. This possibility underscores the 
importance of international ENGOs’ non-interventionist education 
campaigns221 focused on the non-commercial value of whales and the horrors 
of whaling to move people who have been neutral on the topic to favor an 
anti-whaling norm.222 Such campaigns might also moot the negative reaction 
of countries that might see external pressure by other countries to adopt the 
anti-whaling norm as an attack on their national identity. 
In sum, the academics are right that the international regulatory regime 
to protect whales is broken. However, their reliance on a market-based 
trading scheme in whale shares is morally flawed, as it is premised on killing 
 
 217  See Moffa, supra note 208, at 209–10 (“[The Sea Shepherds] harassed Japanese whalers 
by ramming their vessels, throwing bottles of foul-smelling butyric acid onto their vessels, 
temporarily blinding whalers with a laser device, deploying propeller fouling devices to disable 
vessels, and even boarding moving whaling vessels.”). 
 218  See Hirata, supra note 46, at 149 (“Militant action against the Japanese government, 
through the physical blockage of whaling vessels or shaming campaigns, may backfire, 
strengthening the nationalist sentiments of the Japanese public and policy makers.”). 
 219  See Moffa, supra note 208, at 211 (“The general reluctance of any nation to prosecute the 
Sea Shepherds for violations of international law suggests that the benefit of interventionist 
activism outweighs its costs in this case.”); see also id. at 212 (“It is quite possible that the 
global community, at least as evidenced by citizen and government action in Australia and the 
United States, recognizes that by giving real force to international law, the Sea Shepherds and 
other interventionist activist organizations are performing the costly, and often unfunded, 
invocation and application functions arising from obligations to international conventions. By 
allowing interventionist activism to continue, either by explicitly recognizing its legitimacy or 
by refraining from condemning the activists’ illegal tactics, countries utilize private funding to 
monitor and enforce conservation laws, thus saving themselves considerable amounts of tax 
money and government resources.”). But see id. (“Nonetheless, the counterargument goes, 
interventionist activism suffers from the ethical fallacy that ‘two wrongs do not make a right,’ 
and thus its existence undercuts the international rule of law.”). 
 220  See Hirata, supra note 46, at 130 (“The Japanese whaling industry, which employs only a 
few hundred people and generates at best marginal profits, is too small and weak to influence 
government policy.”). 
 221  See Moffa, supra note 208, at 203 (identifying the “two competing models as ‘protest’ and 
‘interventionist’ activism”); see also id. (distinguishing between the law abiding, law-promoting 
activities like consumer boycotts of groups like Greenpeace and confrontational, illegal 
activities of groups like the Sea Shepherds). 
 222  Purdy talks about the role of avoidance in maintaining an ethical status quo. See Purdy, 
supra note 1, at 915; see also id. at 917 (suggesting that “encounters with everyday violence 
might be invaluable now in learning to assess the things we already do but tend not to see”). 
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whales that have moral worth and an entitlement to life. As Sandel shows, 
markets cannot and should not commodify certain goods that possess moral 
worth.223 The solution may lie in persuading whaling countries to adopt a 
whale preservation norm—which might be possible if international ENGOs 
can change peoples’ preferences by carefully designing and executing 
campaigns using public education, boycotts, and direct action. As more 
people engage in the right behavior—such as not demanding whale meat—
and internalize the new norm, a whale preservation norm might emerge. 
External factors like homogenous populations and a decrease in the 
economic importance of whaling in those countries, coupled with the 
growing prominence of the international whale preservation norm, the 
movement of the IWC toward a preservation norm, and the strength of the 
anti-animal cruelty norm in whaling countries like Japan, collectively create 
a “backdrop of shared understandings and social institutions”224 in which 
norm change might occur.225 Although changing norms is a slow process that 
faces many barriers, once norm change starts it is equally hard to reverse. 
Importantly for the purposes of this Essay, this alternative presents none of 
the ethical infirmities of the economists’ approach, which is premised on 
depriving some whales of their right to live so that others might survive. 
 
 
 223  See supra notes 159–60 and accompanying text. 
 224  Ellis, supra note 183, at 39. 
 225  See Purdy, supra note 1, at 924 (“To imagine this change, we have to accept that our 
existing moral grammar . . . is not fixed once and for all, but can expand to make perceptible 
and salient what was once unavailable or impossibly obscure.”). 
